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ABSTRACT

In the 21st century, the applicability of aeronautics in civilian and military life
is common place. The use of planes allows loved ones to visit each other across
countries and continents, reducing what was once an almost insurmountable distance
to a few hours of discomfort. Military strategists accept as a matter of course that the
nation that controls the skies will often control the field below. The 21st century
features human control of the skies as a fact of life. The use of planes as a form of
transportation is thought of little more than the use of trains and automobiles as
fixtures in daily business. Yet what is now taken for granted has only existed for a
single century. At its genesis, airpower faced its opponents and witnessed its
champions.
The following thesis is a technological history in which the German battleship
SMS Ostfriesland serves as a focal point for the technological changes in the early 20th
century. From the ship’s commission during an era dominated by battleships and fleet
action, to its demise as a target in an aerial bomb test, the Ostfriesland provides a
snapshot into the technological history of naval warfare and the development of
modern military thought.
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PROLOGUE
When the Great War ended in 1918, Imperial Germany’s soldiers and sailors
were demoralized and angry at their defeat. During the Armistice, Britain interred the
bulk of Germany’s battle fleet at Scapa Flow until the combatants could negotiate an
official end to the war. At the end of the war, Germany had nothing of value to bargain
with, leaving their fate in the hands of their bitter enemy. Rather than surrender to that
fate, the commander of the interned fleet, Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, gave the order
for his captains to scuttle their ships, depriving the Allied and Associated Powers of
their coveted war prizes.1 The ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 mandated
that the Kaiserliche Marine, Imperial Navy, be decommissioned and portioned out to
the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with Article 185. To replace the
vessels lost at Scapa Flow, the Allied and Associated Powers demanded an additional
five light cruisers and 400,000 tons of docks, tugs, dredges, cranes, and other support
equipment.2
The sailors of the Kaiserliche Marine resisted their vanquishers with a variety
of unique and non-violent methods, but no less effective. With the surrender of their
fleet to the Allies at Rosyth, the German sailors not only refused to clean their vessels
before transferring custody, but actively defiled them through mechanical and
biological sabotage. In many ships and submarines, the sailors rendered the engines
inoperable. With others, they looted anything that could be taken, and damaged what
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couldn’t. Doors were loosened from their fastening catches and watertight
compartments were sabotaged.
More than just damaging the equipment on board the vessels, the sailors also
refused to clean the ships before handing them over to their new wardens. The natural
buildup of dust and grime that accompanies the operation of a warship created a dingy
environment that tarnished the prestige that came with the capture of a high-profile
prize like the German Battle Fleet. The filth was compounded by blatant acts of
defilement by German sailors who were especially intent on complicating the jobs of
the Allied and Associate Powers taking custody of the ships by defecating in the sinks
and otherwise disposing of their human waste in several places throughout the ships
excluding the intended lavatories. The acts of vandalism served as forms of resistance
from a frustrated and war weary fleet that was underutilized during the Great War.
Once their ability to wage war had been neutralized, the vanquished sailors resisted
with the only means left to them: sabotage and wanton destruction.
In 1921, the United States took possession of its ‘victory fleet’ of four
submarines, three torpedo boat destroyers, the light cruiser Frankfurt, and the
battleship Ostfriesland. Many of the vessels in the U.S. share of spoils were the most
decorated and prestigious vessels of the Kaiserliche Marine, though they also
experienced the vandalism of their former crews. American inspectors and engineers
assessed the damage done to the vessels, and while many ships were repaired enough
to make the trans-Atlantic crossing, the submarines and the Frankfurt had to be towed
to their North American ports for their display to the American public as war trophies.

2

As spoils of war, the German vessels represented physical symbols of the
American victory in the Great War. The New York Times described the ships as agents
to “play a part in reducing the world to Teutonic thralldom. And now, like any human
felons, they are to meet the ignominy of execution.”3 In 1921 the ships were
transferred to the Department of Aeronautics in the United States Navy where they
were used as targets in a series of weapons tests off the coast of Virginia. Some fell to
the guns of American battleships, and others, like the Ostfriesland, sank as a result of
aerial bombardment.
The vandalism and sabotage that characterized the German naval resistance
after the war has its roots in the war itself. The following pages describe those origins
and place them in the context of changing attitudes about naval warfare and the future
of fleet action in the 20th century. The apparent underutilization of the High Seas Fleet
during the war was a contributing factor to the diminishing morale that led to mutiny,
but underutilization itself was a signifier of evolving attitudes about the role of the
battle fleet in wartime. The following thesis seeks to address those evolving ideals and
provide the context that will help explain the motivations of the German sailors to
vandalize their ships at the end of the war.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In the 19th century, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his famous work The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, in which he utilized historical conflicts to
demonstrate the significance of control of the seas in achieving wartime victory. By
commanding the waterways and sea lanes, maritime nations achieved victory by
disrupting enemy supply lines while protecting their own, as well as removing the sea
as an option for retreat. In the Napoleonic Wars, British victory was less attributed to
the tactics of the Duke of Wellington and more to Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson’s
ability to out maneuver and outfight the French at sea. Those victories led to a
tradition in which maritime powers considered the ship of the line the pinnacle of
naval technology, a behemoth unmatched by any vessel of a lower class.
In 1921, Brigadier-General William “Billy” Mitchell published a book titled Our
Air Force, The Keystone of National Defense, in which he argued the nature of
warfare was shifting from the sea to the air. Mitchell emphasized the United States’
history of introducing technological advances and then abandoning them while other
nations continued research and development. Regarding air power, Mitchell noted that
“although the United States was the first nation to demonstrate the practicability of
heavier-than-air flight, we allowed ourselves to become so deficient in the
development of this science that we were hopelessly behind when the war in Europe
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started.”4 In Our Air Force, Mitchell utilized Mahan’s own arguments against the
Navy, emphasizing the use of aerial bombers and control of the air as superior to the
battleship and its command of the sea.
Mitchell’s foresight into the significance of air power was ahead of its time. In
retrospect, while his arguments seem obvious, the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics found
them difficult to acknowledge. To demonstrate the legitimacy and effectiveness of
aerial combat against battleships, Mitchell and his Army pilots participated in a series
of bomb tests in which the use of bombs ranging in size from 180 to 2000 pounds
against surrendered German vessels would demonstrate the destructive power of aerial
bombardment against battleships. To the Navy’s great chagrin, Mitchell frequently
violated their testing parameters, refused to wait for orders, and blatantly defied orders
in the final run of the experiments. Mitchell’s actions served him in making his case
about the applicability of air power in naval combat, but his methods antagonized the
navy, increasing the political and professional divide that characterized his quest for a
unified air service.
As a condition of the Versailles Treaty, which went into effect in 1920 and
signified the official end of the First World War, the Allied and Associate Powers
forced Germany to surrender a large portion of its fleet to the Allied powers as a
portion of the reparations package.5 The United States received a small fleet
consisting of submarines, destroyers, light cruisers, and the battleship Ostfriesland,
and the Treaty stipulated that the United States must destroy the vessels or otherwise
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render them unfit for military service by August of 1921, though the method of
destruction remained vague. General Mitchell seized the opportunity to argue for his
bomb tests, which he believed would demonstrate the superiority of air power. The
United States Atlantic Fleet assembled in Chesapeake Bay in the early summer of
1921 to observe Mitchell’s Project B tests, which demonstrated the destructive power
of aerial bombardment against various classes of vessels, providing evidence to
Congress that air power was effective against maritime fleets, both civilian and
military, and that with a unified air force under his command Mitchell could render
navies obsolete. The first stage directed fire at the submarines and destroyers and
utilized small bombs around 180 to 200 pounds. The results demonstrated
conclusively that planes were highly effective against light craft such as “transports,
merchantmen, or any kind of vessel not protected by armor.”6 As the classes of ships
increased in size, the experiment utilized bombs of greater explosive power witch
achieved the same success as experienced with the smaller classes.
Mitchell and his pilots knew that the Navy would not be satisfied with the
destruction of smaller, lightly armored vessel, as many of them “considered this trial
to be utterly useless, because they reasoned that it was entirely impossible to sink, or
even injure, a battleship. That, neither could a battleship be hit by an aerial bomb, and,
if it were hit, could it be damaged to any great extent.”7 While the success of the
smaller tests was integral to the larger argument, Mitchell knew that the real
demonstration must be against a battleship of significant size and strength for

William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power –
Economic and Military, (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1925), 64.
7
Ibid, 56.
6
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Congress and the military traditionalists to be convinced of the practicability of
military aircraft. Among the German warships surrendered to the United States was
the SMS Ostfriesland, a Helgoland-class battleship that was one of the most decorated
and powerful ships in Germany’s High Seas Fleet. Designed to engage the best
battleships of the British Navy, the Ostfriesland displaced 22,800 tons, had a top speed
of twenty-one knots, and was powered by coal-fired triple expansion engines. The
major design feature that made German warships unique were their 30.5cm guns and
50cm torpedoes.8 The size of Germany’s guns characterized their approach to naval
warfare, which was deeply rooted in Wilhelm’s and Tirpitz’s study of Mahan. Without
the rich maritime heritage possessed by England, France, and Russia, Germany was
fervently trying to catch up to her more experienced naval rivals. The larger caliber
guns were indicative of the shifting attitudes about naval warfare which began with
Britain’s development of the Dreadnaught, a fast battlecruiser with fewer, more
powerful weapons and longer range that the British Admiralty believed would usher in
a new age of naval warfare.
Laid down in 1908, the Ostfriesland occupied a critical space in the history of
naval warfare. Designed to contend with the larger fleet of battleships that
characterized the era of Pax Britannica, Kaiser Wilhelm and his Admirals envisioned
the Ostfriesland and her sister ships in the High Seas Fleet elevating Germany to a
maritime power in line with A.T. Mahan’s notion of military strength. First published
in 1890, Mahan’s book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 argued
that numerical superiority accounted for much of the maritime success of the major

8
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world powers against their enemies. While he highlighted several naval battles
throughout history, Nelson’s victories at the Battle of the Nile and Trafalgar were both
particularly important to this argument and still relatively recent history. To that end,
Mahan begins his introduction with a discussion of the basic tactics of those battles,
which were “to choose that part of the enemy’s order which can least easily be helped,
and to attack it with superior forces.”9 Mahan’s work became one of the most
influential geo-political pieces of its time, eventually becoming recommended reading
for every major world leader with global ambitions, including Theodore Roosevelt and
Wilhelm II. His book became a manual that set the naval standard to which all major
powers subscribed, and to which Imperial Germany aspired.
At the beginning of the 20th century, England possessed the largest navy in the
world, having established in 1889 a Naval Defense Act that formalized the “‘Two
Power Standard’ of parity with the next two naval powers, France and Russia.”10
Kaiser Wilhelm II sought to earn prestige as a monarch by elevating Germany to a
maritime power in the same manner his grandfather Wilhelm I had transformed the
Prussian Army to unify Germany under one flag. Unlike his grandfather, whose
reorganization efforts benefited from a long history of military institution, where the
Prussian army was a fixture of society, Wilhelm II faced the challenge of developing a
formidable navy in a country lacking a cohesive naval tradition.
This thesis looks at the Ostfriesland as a battleship built during a crossroads of
naval technology. By tracking the ship’s construction and service history up until her

9
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ultimate demise as an American test subject, the ship’s history reveals the degree to
which Wilhelm II achieved his goals, and the extent to which the Ostfriesland
illustrates changes and innovations in naval technology. By studying this battleship,
this thesis will explore in greater detail the German naval strategy in relation to the
standard set by Mahan and upheld by Great Britain, an approach that few historians
have taken. This is not a German naval history, nor is it a history of the First World
War, though there are strong elements of both within the following pages. Rather, it is
a history of technological advancements, and how those advancements contributed to
an international shift in attitudes about naval warfare. The Ostfriesland began her life
in a world dominated by the prophet of sea power A.T. Mahan and met her fate at the
hands of Billy Mitchell, whose crusade for air power would spell the beginning of the
end for the battleship’s dominion over the sea. Through a study of the Ostfriesland,
this thesis argues that World War I and the technological developments associated
with it represented the transition from the sea to the air as the determinant factor in
victory over a country’s enemies.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
After the British navy defeated the combined fleets of France and Spain at the
Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, it effectively established itself as the superior naval force
in the world, beginning an era that became known as Pax Britannica, or a peace
enforced by British rule. None of England’s traditional rivals were able to match the
enormous size of the British fleet, and while the United States and Japan were quickly
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establishing a presence for themselves on the world stage, neither could challenge
Britain at the turn of the century.11
In April of 1897, during Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, Britain displayed
its naval strength in an extravagant exhibition of force near the port of Spithead
located on the southern coast of England. Six columns of warships, each five miles in
length, a sight that The Times glorified by reporting that “it is at once the most
powerful and far-reaching weapon which the world has ever seen.”12 The display not
only demonstrated the power of the Empire, but also the discipline and tradition that
made Royal Navy the standard of naval custom to which aspiring navies must strive to
imitate if they seek recognition as a viable naval force. While the world witnessed the
magnificent naval parade with awe, Germany announced her plan to build a sizable
battle fleet focused in the North Sea, a direct challenge to Britain’s Home Fleet, her
only defense in those waters.
Kaiser Wilhelm II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz envisioned a battle fleet
of 41 battleships, 20 large cruisers, and 40 light cruisers with which to protect the
colonial holdings Germany had obtained under the guidance of Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck during the 1880s. As would-be disciples of Mahan, Wilhelm and Tirpitz
subscribed to the notion that Germany required a strong navy to support their colonial
holdings and imperial aspirations. Unfortunately, Germany lacked a naval tradition on
the scale of its rival empires. The country was young compared to the other world
powers, having only unified under the Prussian king in the 1870s following a series of

11
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wars that shook the European continent. Germany’s military tradition remained
Prussian, and the ruler of Germany was determined through the Prussian bloodline.
Voltaire had described Prussia’s strength by noting that “where some states have an
army, the Prussian Army has a state,” and the military tradition permeated throughout
the fiber that defined German culture.
After unification, the Reichstag frequently debated the issue of foreign expansion
and German colonialism. In 1879 Dr. Friedrich Fabri, a Protestant theologian widely
considered the father of German colonialism, wrote the book Does Germany Need
Colonies? in which he argued that
as we see it, public sentiment is now, as a result of our general development
during the last few years, fully prepared to apply itself with lively interest to the
question of whether the German Reich stands in need of colonial possessions. The
reasons for this change of mood are readily discernible. Three considerations may
be said to be chiefly decisive in this connection: our economic position, the crisis
in our tariff and trade policy, and our navy which is growing mightily.13
Fabri and his contemporaries felt strongly that a nation’s prosperity required
expansion, which required an overseas policy. During the century in which the British
Royal Navy controlled the seas, an effective overseas policy was unfathomable
without a navy powerful enough to demand respect for a nation’s commercial interests
in peace and to defend them in war. Despite the numerous advocates of colonial
expansion, there remained powerful opponents to the notion of colonization in the socalled “French style.”

13
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Chancellor Otto von Bismarck resisted the 19th-century European colonial
practices, citing that they required too much government involvement and national
expense. Instead, he favored colonies based on a Royal Charter in the tradition of
Britain’s colonies, where responsibility for government and protection lay solely with
the colonists themselves.14 He described his approach to German colonialism by
claiming that “our intention is not to establish provinces but rather to protect
commercial enterprises. We will, however, use the most advanced methods to ensure
their free development and protect them against attacks from their immediate
neighbors and from oppression and damage wrought by other European powers.”15
Though he was not opposed to individual efforts to expand German territory,
Bismarck was reluctant to provide national aid until a colony had proven itself
economically beneficial to the Reich.
His lack of interest in an overseas empire meant that Bismarck wanted the
German navy to remain “a sea power of the second rank.”16 Bismarck’s primary
concern lay with securing Germany’s continental presence in the European political
sphere, but in 1888 Wilhelm II ascended to the throne with visions of a grand German
battle fleet, placing his and Bismarck’s ambitions at odds. In March of 1890, the
Kaiser dismissed Bismarck, obsessed with the notion that the world was about to
undergo a reapportionment through which old empires would die and Germany would
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be able to rise. Wilhelm spent the first decade of his reign working to build the first
iteration of the “High Seas Fleet,” commissioning several battleships and overseeing
advances in vessel design. His obsession with control over the formation of his fleet
led him to dissolve the Imperial Admiralty and replace it with two rival naval
commands; the High Command and the Navy Office, effectively destroying unity
between planning and command.17
In the years immediately
prior to Tirpitz’ appointment as
State Secretary of the Navy
Office, Wilhelm focused his
attention on the construction of
torpedo boats and a uniform
design of battlecruisers that would
be suitable for both protection of
colonial possessions and service
in the main battle fleet. This focus
on smaller vessels was due in part
to the French author Théophile
Aube who challenged Europe’s
reliance on ships of the line by
Figure 1: Bernhard von Bülow

arguing that torpedo-boats were
the main weapon with which

17
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secondary naval powers could hope to neutralize Britain’s battleship superiority.18
Tirpitz himself was initially an ardent supporter of torpedo-boats, but with the
publication of Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power Upon History in 1890, both he and
Wilhelm II embraced Mahan’s model of naval superiority. In an 1897 address to the
Reichstag, Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bülow, depicted in Figure 1, asserted that
Germany must demand respect for its overseas holdings, especially those in
Kiaochow, China. 19 The tone of his speech was passionate, yet careful to avoid
provocation of rival empires. The most famous line that proponents of a German battle
fleet would use to justify naval expenditure came toward the end when he declared
“we do not want to put anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place in the
sun.”20
The industrial revolution of the late 19th century helped inspire Germany to catch
up with her rival powers that had the advantage of centuries to carve out their place on
the world stage. The Empires of Britain and France, as well as the Western Frontier
into which the United States was expanding, left Wilhelm and the German Empire
with a sense of claustrophobia and constraint. When juxtaposed with the belief that the
20th century would involve shifts of power in Asia and South Africa, Tirpitz argued
that the Imperial Navy had become a question of survival for Germany. He argued that
if Germany were not prepared to take advantage of the anticipated power shifts with a
large battle fleet, Germany “would sink back to the status of a poor farming
Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 15.
Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=1705
20
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http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/607_Buelow_Place%20in%20the%20Sun_111.pdf.
Accessed 23 January 2018.
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country.”21 Historian Holger Herwig assessed Tirpitz political maneuvering and
economic motives aptly:
Vast ship-building contracts would also act as a pump-primer for German
Industry. Especially, regular placements of contracts would help to overcome the
vicissitudes of the capitalist business cycle, and bring added prosperity to the
German proletariat. Tirpitz description of the fleet as ‘a strong palliative against
Social Democrats’ expressed his hopes for its effect in settling domestic social
rifts.22
Britain’s Two Power Standard in the last decade of the 19th century directly
contributed to Germany’s feeling of inadequacy in her confinement to continental
power status, rather than the world power it aspired to be. After the Spanish-American
War, the United States developed a navy powerful enough to cause England to realize
the limits of its Two Power Standard and presented a new maritime rival for Germany.
Most of Germany’s political leaders became convinced that to secure their place in the
sun, they would need foreign possessions and a battle fleet capable of challenging not
only England but also America. In a letter to Admiral von Stosch dated February of
1896, Tirpitz argued that Germany’s growing industrial capacity demanded a strong
navy. He asserted that German foreign policy had overlooked the political significance
of naval power and wrote “if we want to go out into the world and increase our
economic strength at sea, we will only construct a hollow edifice if we do not obtain a
degree of naval strength…. Naval power is the only politically versatile type of power
there is.”23 Tirpitz then described a hypothetical war with England based on the
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current naval capabilities of the respective nations, concluding that Germany’s current
battle fleet was incapable of securing victory against England without the intervention
of France or Russia.
Germany’s naval expansion was not unique. Aside from England and the United
States, other industrialized countries were rapidly expanding their colonial holdings,
which required naval protection. On its own, the first German Navy Law, which
passed in 1898, was not unjustified nor unreasonable. It was significant and viewed
with such apprehension because it directly challenged England and aimed to create a
modern battle fleet stationed in the North Sea, poised to directly threaten Britain in its
own waters. In June 1897, the same month Wilhelm appointed him Minister for the
Reich Navy Office, Tirpitz wrote in a memorandum to the Kaiser that “our fleet must
be so constructed that it can unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland
and the Thames.”24 Tirpitz chose the North Sea as the focal point for his battle fleet
not only because it was one of Germany’s only coastal regions, but it was also
England’s least protected region. There was no denying that the construction of a
massive fleet in England’s weak point would capture the attention of the most
powerful navy in the world. To this end, the First Navy Law passed the Reichstag in
the spring of 1898 and authorized the construction of “two homogeneous squadrons of
eight battleships and one fleet flagship, seventeen capital units in all, each to be
replaced automatically after twenty-five years.”25
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The following year, Wilhelm and Tirpitz doubled the size of the proposed fleet to
four squadrons, establishing a three-ship per year pace. The push for further expansion
required some explanation to the Reichstag. The argument Tirpitz presented was
known as the “Risk Theory,” in which he asserted that
England’s second point of weakness is that it lacks an army to protect the
mainland in the event that the home fleet is defeated. We will be secure from an
English attack if it is possible for us to build a battle fleet that is capable of taking
on England’s home fleet – raising the specter of a loss of this fleet and of an
unprotected mainland.26
Though it was far from the final realization of Tirpitz’s vision of a German
battle fleet, the Novelle of 1900 was an important step in the naval arms race between
Germany and England. The First Navy Law of 1898 and the subsequent Novelle of
1900 marked Germany’s official embrace of the battleship as the focal point of its
High Seas Fleet and Germany’s earnest competition with the Royal Navy in an arms
race that would have far-reaching consequences.
In 1905, First Sea Lord John “Jackie” Fisher sought to shake the Royal Navy
out of a century of complacency to meet the danger presented by Germany’s growing
battle fleet. Fisher’s vision for success involved phasing out Britain’ obsolete
battleships and reforming the fleet into a modernized scheme of torpedo boats,
submarines, and fast, lightly armored ships with uniform armaments of heavy guns, a
class later designated as ‘battlecruisers.’27 Britain’s advances in long-range gunnery
further contributed to the mounting naval competition, and in 1905, Fisher
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commissioned a new type of battleship that would integrate the benefits of a
battlecruiser with the traditional notion of a warship. The HMS Dreadnought hosted a
battery of ten 12-inch heavy guns with no secondary battery, only supplementary
rapid-firing guns to repel torpedo boats. Rather than the triple-expansion engines of
her predecessors, the Dreadnought was fitted with a turbine engine, granting her a
speed of 21 knots, faster than any contemporary battleship.28 Her revolutionary design
rendered all previous classes of battleships obsolete and served as the model for future
battleships throughout the world. The new design caught German naval planners off
guard. They had planned for traditional designs. The move forced Germany to
completely redesign their proposals for naval expansion and forced a halt on current
battleship construction to update shipyard facilities to accommodate the new advances.
The Dreadnought disrupted Tirpitz entire plan, and the deviation required to
meet the threat of the new battleship standard exploded the budgetary requirements.
Historian Peter Padfield observed that
Had Germany been governed rationally Tirpitz would have been removed or
forced to rethink his goals. But the fleet was an extension of Wilhelm’s ego, and
he clung to Tirpitz even as the Reich was forced farther and farther into internal
and external deadlock.29
Tirpitz’s reaction to the Dreadnought challenge was to double down on his
battleship construction and pursue his original notion of superior numbers being
synonymous with a tactical advantage. He disregarded the significance of long-range
gunnery and speed, as evidenced by the size of his battleships, and failed to realize the
potential of submarines against a superior force. Ever the traditionalist, Tirpitz did not
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anticipate England conducting a war in a manner other than their traditional strategy of
imposing a naval blockade. That assumption was the focus on which he devised the
entire battle fleet design, envisioning a decisive naval battle that would leave England
weakened, if not defeated.
Germany found her circumstances further complicated when England reached
an entente agreement with France, her traditional enemy. After a similar agreement
with Russia, Reich Chancellor Bülow branded the policy “encirclement,” which he
defined as
“the creation
of a ring of
powers
around
Germany to
isolate and
cripple
her.”30
Figure 2: The SMS Ostfriesland Under Steam

Tirpitz used

the concern and fear generated by Britain’s new allies to pass another Novelle. This
increased the number and size of capital ships between 1908 and 1911 and reduce the
service history of each ship from twenty-five to twenty years.
With the passage of this new Novelle, German industry became extremely
reliant on naval construction contracts, which gave Tirpitz the political leverage to
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continue pushing his ambitions for a strong German Navy. Herwig described the 1908
increases as having “heated the Anglo-German naval race to a fiery white.”31 In 1907,
Germany had established a Naval Artillery School in which it tested the applicability
of large-caliber guns on battleships. The application of the large guns would be the
defining characteristic of all future capital ships of the High Seas Fleet.
Between 1908 and 1912, Germany began construction on four battleships of
the Helgoland-class, each characterized by the adoption of 30.5cm guns as their
primary armament. Examining the service history of one of these vessels, the SMS
Ostfriesland, (depicted in Figure 2 under steam) from her construction to her final
sinking allows us to explore its innovations and adaptations in the larger context of
shifting attitudes of naval warfare. 32 As a second-generation dreadnought battleship,
the Ostfriesland was far from the final and most advanced capital ship constructed in
Tirpitz’s grand vision, but it was one of the last to be constructed prior to the threat of
aircraft, placing it in a unique place in the history of 20th-century naval warfare and
technological evolution.
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CHAPTER 2

TECHNOLOGICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT WAR

A complete historiography of the First World War would require several
hundred pages. It would include notable works focused on topics like armies and
commanders, which are of limited use for this study. Historiographical essays on
Grand Admirals Tirpitz and Scheer alone would represent major undertakings.
Likewise, historians have extensively researched the rulers and political advisors that
orchestrated the first modernized war. Despite the depth and range of scholarship on
the war in general, studies of the High Seas Fleet and technological changes in early
20th-century naval advances are remarkably absent.
A few notable scholars have addressed this dearth of knowledge. At the top of
the list is undoubtedly Holger Herwig. His 1980 work, “Luxury Fleet:” The Imperial
German Navy 1888-1918, provides an important framework for scholars interested in
the history of the 20th century Imperial German Navy. He skillfully recounts the lack
of naval tradition in the Prussian military and the challenges Kaiser Wilhelm II faced
in realizing his naval ambitions. By recounting the state of the German navy at the
point of unification, Herwig provides his readers the context in which a young Alfred
Tirpitz became the ambitious fleet builder of the late 19th and early 20th century. More
importantly, Herwig discusses the greater significance of the fleet as a symbol of
Imperial Germany’s global ambitions and its search for a “place in the sun.” Through
his insightful analysis, Herwig demonstrates that Germany sought to use its navy to
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assert her role as a global power, not one confined to the limitations of its army. For
these reasons, this book is invaluable to placing the story of the Ostfriesland in its
proper historical and political context.
In telling the story of the Ostfriesland and its place in shifting naval attitudes,
it is also necessary to discuss the use of aircraft in the Great War. For the history of
strategic bombing and its origins in the Great War, Neville Jones’ work The Origins of
Strategic Bombing: A study of the Development of British Air Strategic Thought and
Practice up to 1918 is particularly useful.33 This book, about British air power rather
than German, is important to the technological history of the Great War and Mitchell’s
bomb tests, because it was the Royal Navy airplanes that provided cause for the
various refits the Ostfriesland experienced to provide defense against aerial attack.
Jones’ work discusses the conflicting attitudes concerning air power in the
beginning stages of its military deployment. Through a detailed analysis, he clarifies
the technological context of the Ostfriesland’s story. His research provides
information that helps demonstrate the origins of the military attitudes that Mitchell
was facing when planning his bomb tests, and why the Ostfriesland was key to his
success. He notes that it was the Germans who possessed an effective aerial service
during the war, and that German air power had grown to a level that represented a
clear and present danger to Britain’s military facilities. One of his most important
arguments is the reluctance of the Air Commanders to utilize air power for anything
but support for the land forces in the trenches.
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Quentin Reynolds’ work They Fought for the Sky: The Dramatic Story of the
First War in the Air presents a social history of the pilots that served in the first war
featuring aircraft. None felt the frustration of underutilization more than the pilots who
were ordered to conduct scouting missions rather than test their mettle against the
German Aces like Manfred von Richthofen, better known as the Red Baron. Written in
1957, Reynolds utilized interviews with Great War flyers from many nations to tell his
story. His bibliography boasts over a hundred sources, and in his introduction, he
explains to his readers that “the bibliography listed at the end of this experiment
(every book is an experiment) lists about one hundred books, but does not list the
hundreds of magazine and newspaper articles I lived with for so long. If this be
stealing, I hope my critics will at least do me the compliment of accusing me of grand
larceny, not of petty theft.”34 There are few historical facts that Reynolds produces that
cannot be found elsewhere, but his narrative style contributes a great deal to the spirit
of this history. Without his witty writing and amiable treatment of his subjects, his
would be just another drab history of a violent and brutal war.
A discussion of the manner in which the Ostfriesland intersected with colliding
attitudes of naval warfare necessitated a thorough investigation of the air services in
the Great War. John H. Morrow, Jr’s Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from
1909-1921 breaks down the air services of the Great War year by year, diligently
recording their prominence in the latter years of the war, and the rapidity with which
the air services fell from dominance in the interwar period. His book is important for
placing Mitchell’s struggle in context. Alan Clark’s Aces High: The War in the Air
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over the Western Front 1914-18 is useful in providing background for the evolution of
air combat during the first war in which aircraft were built for military service.
Key to the technological history of the early 20th century is Brigadier General
William “Billy” Mitchell, the Army General who was ambitious enough to design an
experiment in which the applicability of aircraft in naval warfare could be tested.
Many of the biographies written bear titles describing Mitchell as a “pioneer” or
“crusader” for air power. Others have called him a “prophet without honor.” All of
them focus on the fact that Mitchell was one of the first advocates for air power in an
application more diverse than support for ground troops.
Though somewhat dated, Billy Mitchell: Founder of Our Air Force and
Prophet without Honor by Emile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen is an incredibly wellwritten and accessible piece that brings the story of Mitchell’s political battle with the
Navy to life.35 One of the authors, Emile Gauvreau, was a long-time friend of
Mitchell’s, and the story begins with a meeting between Gauvreau and James V.
Martin, renowned aircraft innovator, in which they sat at Mitchell’s favorite table in
his favorite restaurant in New York during a blackout in 1942 and reflect on the ways
in which Mitchell was correct about the applicability of air power in warfare. The
writing styles are reminiscent of a novel, but the arguments and events are historically
accurate. Particularly important is Chapter IV entitled “The Ostfriesland and Mister
Katsuda,” which details Mitchell’s frustration with the Admiralty’s restrictions on his
tests and his defiance in the final engagement with the ship of interest. Gauvreau and
Cohen wrote the book in 1942, when Mitchell’s prophecies were painfully evident

35

Emile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen, Billy Mitchell: Founder of Our Air Force and Prophet without
Honor, (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1942).

24

every day of World War II. Despite its age, it still provides valuable material for the
political environment that is essential to this story.
Mitchell’s handling of the Ostfriesland caused a significant controversy within
the command structure of the U.S. military. In his work The Mitchell Affair, Burke
Davis accesses both Mitchell’s court-martial record and his personal military file, both
released in the sixties, after their fifty years of confidentiality had expired. His work
serves as a biography of sorts but is also valuable in its analysis and breakdown of
Mitchell’s Project B plan, and the significance of the Ostfriesland to it. Davis is the
perhaps the only biographer of Mitchell to refer to the Ostfriesland as “unsinkable,”
and as such provides another layer of analysis to the complex history of Mitchell’s
rivalry with the Navy. The depth of Davis’ history is beneficial to the intricate and
nuanced political battlefield Mitchell found himself in while trying to build the air
force he saw as indispensable to national defense.
No history of Billy Mitchell and the Ostfriesland is complete without the
inclusion of Thomas Wildenberg’s recent work Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy:
The Interwar Rivalry Over Air Power. Published in 2013, Wildenberg’s book
represents the most recent scholarship on the controversy surrounding Mitchell and his
rivals in the Navy during the 1920s. Unlike other works on Mitchell, Wildenberg
depicts the story from the Navy’s perspective, whose leaders were not afraid to admit
that Mitchell’s arguments for air power had merit, but despised the man for his tactics
and brash disrespect of the naval service.
Wildenberg leaves no stone unturned as he delves into the creation of the
public relations war that Mitchell fiercely waged against the Navy in his crusade to
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unify all of America’s air services into a single branch under his command. Through
manipulation and hyperbole, Mitchell ruthlessly antagonized the Navy’s claim on air
power by arrogantly asserting his belief that with the proper funding and support, a
unified Air Service under his command would render the role of the Navy as the
nation’s first line of defense obsolete. Wildenberg’s thorough investigation of the
relationship between Mitchell and his counterparts in the Navy reveals how complex
and entrenched the competition was, tracing it back as far as the Great War.
Wildenberg’s scholarship does not attempt to discredit the previous works on
Mitchell and his contributions to the development of air power in the United States,
but he does work to create a more comprehensive narrative that gives credit where
credit is due and provides criticism where necessary. He emphasizes that money
motivated Mitchell’s rivalry with the navy, which had also developed an air service
during the Great War, and both services were vying for a piece of the limited funds
Congress allocated to the military in the post-war period. The financial argument
places the technological history in a context where aeronautical services were
struggling to develop during a period of peace, when there was no justification for
their application.
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CHAPTER 3

SERVICE HISTORY OF THE SMS OSTFRIESLAND

The SMS Ostfriesland was the second vessel of the Helgoland-class battleships
authorized by the Novelle of 1908. Constructed at the Wilhelmshaven Dockyard, she
measured 546 feet long with a beam of 93.5 feet. She displaced 22,800 tons and was
propelled by three four-cylinder triple expansion steam engines driving three screws
with 28,000-35,000 horsepower, giving her a top speed of 21 knots. Like her sister
ships,36 the Ostfriesland featured twelve 30.5cm (12-inch) guns mounted on six
rotating turrets. While the idea of fewer, more powerful guns stemmed from the
Dreadnought design, Britain’s Grand Fleet hosted smaller guns with longer range. The
Ostfriesland also bore fourteen 5.9-inch and another fourteen 4.1-inch rapid-fire guns
for use against torpedo boats, as well as six 50cm torpedo tubes. Heavily armored with
300mm plating around the belt, turrets, and barbettes, as well as 63.5 mm on the deck,
the Germans designed her to be a tough nut to crack.37 A mammoth of a ship, the
Ostfriesland exemplified the role of the battleship as the backbone of a battle fleet.
After completing sea trials in September of 1909, the Ostfriesland was
assigned to the I Battle Squadron of the High Seas Fleet, where she conducted
individual ship exercises, followed by 1st Squadron, and the fleet maneuvers. In April
of 1912, she became the I Squadron flagship, a role she would fill until the end of the
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First World War. In July of 1912, she led I Squadron on their annual summer cruise to
Norway when word of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Austria’s
ultimatum to Serbia reached the German Admiralty, cutting their cruise short and
causing their return to Wilhelmshaven. By the end of the month, Austria-Hungary
declared war on Serbia, whom they deemed responsible for Ferdinand’s death, and her
allies shortly followed suit, marking the start of the War to End all Wars.
The first naval battle of the war took place on 28 August 1914, when ships of the
British Grand Fleet engaged a German patrol off the Helgoland Bight, a Germancontrolled bay that extends from the mouth of the River Elbe to the islands of
Helgoland and lies between the East Frisian island of Wangerooge and the North
Frisian peninsula of Eiderstedt. The British had noted the regularity with which the
High Seas Fleet conducted its North Sea patrols and devised a plan of attack to sink or
damage several of its battlecruisers. A small force of submarines served to draw out
the German patrols while a joint task force of nine British submarines and thirty-one
destroyers moved to cut off their retreat.
The Helgoland held her post as ship of the watch at Schilling Roads when the
crew heard fire from the direction of Helgoland. Fog and rain from an impending
storm drastically reduced visibility, lending cover to the British forces and allowing
them to approach the German fleet with ease. Richard Stumpf, in his diary written
shortly after the battle and based on accounts given to him by sailors who witnessed
the action, related that many of the German ships in position to respond did not fill all
of their boilers with steam, causing them to engage the British one by one, rather than
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in formation.38 Stumpf recorded that after a lengthy wait for the dockyard tug to
offload the unnecessary but expensive equipment such as shell casings from gunnery
practice, the Ostfriesland issued the order at 1630 to raise anchor and follow in a keel
line. En route, the Ostfriesland and Helgoland encountered the cruisers Frauenlob and
Stettin, which had been engaged in the battle and suffered minor damage.
Stumpf noted that the British used shells without delaying fuses, meaning they
would explode on contact with the German ships’ armor, rather than detonating after
penetrating through the armor to more vulnerable portions of the vessels. In fact,
Britain continued to use black powder shells until after Jutland, making them inferior
to German ammunition.39 Despite their inferior ammunition, Britain still managed to
soundly defeat the German fleet in the first naval action of the war. Germany lost three
cruisers and a torpedo boat and suffered 1242 casualties. Britain lost 75 men and had
to tow their cruiser Arethusa back to port. This naval loss spurred the Kaiser to order
the Commander of the High Seas Fleet to avoid further losses of ships at all costs,
mandating all plans for further missions and sorties receive approval from him
personally, effectively stripping the navy of its scope for action.
After Helgoland, the Ostfriesland resumed training cruises in September, and
by October 1914, the use of aircraft had become sufficiently threatening that the ship’s
4.1-inch guns were replaced with 8.8cm Flak guns for anti-aircraft defense. While on
its own, this detail may seem insignificant, it reflects some of the changing attitudes
and technologies occurring early in the war. In November 1914, the German naval
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command sought ways to attack Britain without risking the loss of its ships. Given the
superior numbers of the Grand Fleet in relation to the High Seas Fleet, Germany
formulated a plan to lay mines near the English coast and sink smaller, individual
ships. The raid was designed as a minelaying mission, with a secondary objective to
lure smaller British ships to sea, where the rest of the High Seas Fleet would be
waiting in ambush.
Carried out by battlecruisers under the command of Admiral Franz von Hipper,
the Ostfriesland and the I Squadron sailed with the bulk of the fleet waiting to ambush
any British vessels unfortunate enough to cross their path. In that capacity, the ship
saw little action, and the raid accomplished little tactically, although it emboldened the
German naval command and encouraged future raids. In December, the High Seas
Fleet would again venture toward the English shore, this time with greater effect.
On 15 December, Hipper once more sailed for the English coast to lay mines
and lure unsuspecting ships into an ambush. Many of Germany’s admirals knew that
victory at sea required a reduction of Britain’s superior numbers, and the raids on
Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby sought to force the British to divide the Grand
Fleet to better protect England’s shore, rather than stay together as they had done so
far. While Hipper’s battlecruisers shelled the English shore, Admiral of the High Seas
Fleet Friedrich Ingenohl held the rest of the battleships and destroyers in the Dogger
Bank, where they could engage or retreat as necessary.
History benefits from the gift of hindsight. Had the main force of the High
Seas Fleet had a more competent commander, the Royal Navy would have faced an
engagement in which six of the most powerful dreadnoughts and four battlecruisers of
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the Grand Fleet would be forced to contend with the entirety of the dreadnoughts and
support craft of the High Seas Fleet.40 Unfortunately, Commander Ingenohl lacked
the daring and decisiveness inherent in successful fleet commanders, and when he first
encountered the British dreadnoughts, he ordered his superior force to retreat,
believing the bulk of the Grand Fleet was nearby. Had he pressed the attack, he would
have earned recognition as the commander to even the odds against the most powerful
navy in the world. His lack of daring instead caused him to miss a strategic
opportunity and the Ostfriesland again returned to port without meaningful
engagement with the enemy.
The missed opportunities at the Dogger Bank prompted Kaiser Wilhelm II to
replace Ingenohl as Fleet Commander with Admiral Hugo von Pohl, a cautious
commander who favored unrestricted submarine warfare over surface fleet
engagements with the Grand Fleet. Consequently, the High Seas Fleet was inactive in
the North Sea for nearly a year, as Pohl limited its deployment “to several minor ‘tipand-run’ sorties,” a phrase which here means a rapid engagement followed by a swift
retreat.41 As a member of the Admiralty Staff, Pohl even went to lengths to hinder the
operating freedom of the High Seas Fleet “in order to use it for security at the peace
table,”42 an opinion he shared with many in the Imperial Headquarters who still
believed in 1915 that the war would be a short one. Pohl’s command deprived the
Ostfriesland and the other surface vessels of the High Seas Fleet from opportunities to
engage the Grand Fleet and inflict any meaningful damage on the Royal Navy.
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The fleet’s inactivity was short-lived, however, as in January 1916, Admiral
Pohl’s cancer had advanced to such a degree that he could no longer perform his
duties as an Admiral of the Fleet. The vacant office was quickly filled by Vizeadmiral
(Vice Admiral) Reinhard Scheer, who adopted a more aggressive policy designed to
force the Grand Fleet into confrontation with the Kaiserlichemarine. In April 1916,
the Ostfriesland supported Admiral von Hipper’s battle-cruiser bombardment on
Yarmouth and Lowestoft, in which Scheer intended to draw out defending ships and
pick them off. As with previous engagements, the results were inconclusive, and the
High Seas Fleet withdrew before the bulk of the Grand Fleet could meet them.
Scheer’s aggressive policy held more promise than either Ingenohl or Pohl’s and on 31
May 1916, the High Seas Fleet executed a sortie into the North Sea that held the
potential to definitively determine which navy was the victor in the arms race of the
previous decades.

SKAGERRAK: 31 MAY – 1 JUNE 1916
The action of 31 May 1916 began as a sortie. It was part of Scheer’s overall
strategy to draw out and defeat a portion of the Grand Fleet so as to slowly reduce
Britain’s numerical superiority by engaging and sinking its ships through a series of
smaller actions. Scheer’s plan required the battlecruiser fleet, under the command of
Admiral Franz von Hipper, to screen the approach of the larger battle fleet while also
baiting the Grand Fleet into battle. Scheer took the dreadnoughts of I and III
Squadrons north toward the Skagerrak, which would then move to intercept the Grand
Fleet as it approached the battlecruisers.
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Overall command of the Grand Fleet rested with the Commander-in-Chief
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. His plan at Skagerrak called for a division of the fleet into
two units, the battlecruiser unit commanded by Vice-Admiral David Beatty, and the
larger dreadnoughts that made up the main force. His plan of battle called for Beatty’s
battlecruisers to act as the vanguard, engaging the German van with long-range fire
and torpedoes, destroying what they could and slowing the main force before the final
confrontation with Jellicoe’s battle fleet. Jellicoe’s fleet left their ports at Scapa Flow
and Moray Firth at midnight 31 May, followed shortly by Beatty’s departure from the
Firth of Forth at 1 a.m. The two fleets cruised into the North Sea for a rendezvous with
what would prove to be the largest fleet action in the Great War.
Hipper set sail from the Jade Basin at 4 a.m.43 on 31 May, flying his flag from
the battlecruiser Lützow. He had under his command five battle cruisers of the 1st
Scouting Group, four light battlecruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group, and a total of
thirty destroyers from the 2nd, 6th, and 9th Flotillas. Scheer followed at 4:30 a.m.,
setting sail from the Jade and the Elbe with his flag aboard the Friedrich der Grosse.
He had under his command the dreadnoughts of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons, six predreadnoughts of the 2nd Squadron, which he included last minute after the squadron
commanders appealed for inclusion in the sortie, five light cruisers of the 4th Scouting
Group, and thirty-one destroyers. The combined strength of the High Seas Fleet
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Figure 3: Fleet action at Jutland

sailing toward the Skagerrak was sixteen dreadnoughts, six pre-dreadnoughts, five
battlecruisers, eleven light cruisers, and sixty-one destroyers. 44
Figure 3 illustrates both German and fleet movements in the battle of Jutland
from the initial stages to the point where the two fleets engaged in combat. 45 A heavy
mist descended over the North Sea as Hipper and Scheer steamed northward and
Beatty and Jellicoe moved their squadrons east. With only seven miles of visibility,
Beatty moved his cruisers from their port at the Firth of Forth and Jellicoe led the bulk
of the Grand Fleet from their anchorage in Scapa Flow. At 3:51p.m., Beatty gave the
order for his fleet to adopt a heading of North by East to rendezvous with Jellicoe and
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the main battle fleet. Though that heading would have eventually led to contact with
Hipper’s cruisers, the battle began when both squadrons sighted a Dutch fishing boat.
As Beatty moved to investigate, his cruisers found that two of Hipper’s destroyers had
stopped the boat and the lead ship Galatea immediately raised the signal “Enemy
Sighted” and the opened fire with Phaeton at 4.28 p.m., initiating the largest naval
battle of the Great War. 46
Years later, after the war had ended and the official narrative had labeled the
action at the Skagerrak as the Battle of Jutland, Scheer wrote down his version of
events. When describing the morale at the beginning of the battleship phase, he wrote
“there was never any question of our line veering round to avoid an encounter. The
resolve to do battle with the enemy stood from the first.”47 While Hipper and Beatty
engaged each other in open combat, each working to outmaneuver and outgun the
other, Scheer and the Main Fleet arrived on the scene around 4:48 pm in which
Squadron III led the center line and Friedrich der Grosse sailed at the head of
Squadron I at the center, with the Ostfriesland astern.48 As they closed the distance
with Beatty’s ships, the Ostfriesland and ten cruisers fired on Beatty’s 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron. The Ostfriesland targeted the HMS Southampton but failed to score
a hit. She then shifted fire to the HMS Birmingham and Nottingham but again failed to

46

The details of the cruiser phase of the Battle of Jutland can be found in many locations, especially
Marder’s book, which is written with an Anglo-centric perspective. For the purposes of this thesis, I
skip ahead a few hours to when Scheer and Jellicoe join the fray, as that was the portion of the action in
which the Ostfriesland was involved.
47
Admiral Reinhard Scheer, Germany’s High Seas Fleet in the World War, (New York: Peter Smith,
1934), 152.
48
Ibid, 146.

35

Figure 4: A Zeppelin occupies the airspace over the Ostfriesland

damage her targets. Shortly after 7:15 that night, HMS Warspite ventured into range of
Ostfriesland’s heavy guns. The German battleship managed to score hits with her third
and fourth salvos, riddling the Warspite with a total of thirteen heavy shells.
As the battle progressed, the German vanguard continued to take heavy fire.
Historians have tried to interpret Scheer’s maneuvers in many ways, but Scheer
himself argued that when his battleships veered away from the Grand Fleet, he felt it
was too early for a full retreat, arguing:
It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us our action in
retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of
retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be
compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by
enemy pressure….and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset.
Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving it
to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the next morning. There was but
36

one way of averting this – to force the enemy into a second battle by another
determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo-boats to attack. 49
Under the assumption that the second encounter was by Scheer’s design, his tactic
was for his ships to deal a blow to Jellicoe’s center line. Jellicoe’s ships targeted the
battle cruisers of the Fifth Division, which combined with the pre-dreadnoughts of
the 2nd Division drew the brunt of the British fire. This allowed German torpedoboats the opportunity to inflict significant damage to the Grand Fleet. This second
action served primarily to provide a delay, so the High Seas Fleet could withdraw
under cover of darkness. At 9:17 p.m., Scheer issued the order to turn about and the
Ostfriesland led the rest of the ships in a starboard turn that would eventually take
them home.
The battle continued through the night. Scheer utilized the cover of darkness to
attempt to outmaneuver the British encircling movement and reach Horns Reef,
insuring the “liberty of decision” for the next morning belonged to him. The British
harassed them with brief but intense skirmishes, and at 2 a.m., the HMS Black Prince
sailed within 1500 meters of the Ostfriesland and Thüringen, both of whom
immediately opened fire. Within seconds the ship was on fire. Four minutes later an
explosion sent her to the bottom with all 857 hands. 50
Scheer and his battle fleet arrived at Horns Reef at 5 a.m., where they waited
for Hipper to arrive on the Lützow. British guns had damaged Hipper’s flagship to a
startling degree. From 11:30 p.m., the ship had only been able to sail at 13 knots, with
limited means of navigation, and her gun power was reduced to twenty percent. The
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convoy boat G-40 relayed news to Scheer that at 4 a.m., the Hipper ordered the crew
to abandon ship.51 At that news, Scheer “had no difficulty in drawing on [his] own
conclusions. As the enemy did not come down from the North, even with light forces,
it was evident that he was retiring, especially as nothing more could be seen of him
notwithstanding that his torpedo-boats were about until dawn.”52 Using this
information, Scheer ordered the Main Fleet to return to Germany at daybreak. On the
way back to Wilhelmshaven, the Ostfriesland hit a mine causing her to take on 400
tons of water but was able to return to port under her own power.
During the Battle of Jutland, the Ostfriesland had fired 111 rounds from her
main battery, 101 shells from her 15 cm guns, and a single 8.8 cm Flak shell. Her only
damage was from the mine, which killed one sailor and wounded ten, but left a sizable
hole in her bow. Richard Stumpf described the damage as “a hole as big as a mediumsized barn door gaped in the outer shell; the torpedo bulkhead had been shattered as
though it was a pane of glass and the vertical and horizontal ship’s ribs stuck out like
the bristles of a porcupine.”53 The ship would remain in drydock for repairs until 26 July
1916. It is important to not that throughout the Battle of Jutland, as well as many of the
German sorties into the North Sea, Zeppelins were utilized as reconnaissance scouts to
locate the Grand Fleet and communicate the positions of British ships to the High Seas
Fleet. Figure 4 depicts a German Zeppelin flying above the Ostfriesland, presumably
conducting a scouting mission during a sortie into the North Sea. 54
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Accounts of the Battle of Jutland varied depending on who was reporting it.
Since the outcome has largely been considered a British victory, casualty reports tend
to come from British sources. The losses for the British amounted to three battle
cruisers, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. The High Seas Fleet lost one battle ship,
one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five torpedo boats. The Grand Fleet suffered
6,784 casualties while the Germans counted 2,400 killed and 400 wounded.55 The
tactical victory went to Germany. As Arthur Marder expressed in his definitive work on
the Royal Navy in the First World War, “Jutland revealed the Royal Navy’s general
technical inferiority as compared with the German Navy.”56 The battle demonstrated the
skill of German sailors at sea, although Jellicoe focused his strategy more on the longterm confinement, rather than outright action. Where Germany sought decisive action
against the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe resisted the Nelsonian tactics of fleet-to-fleet action
and opted for a long-distance blockade to keep the High Seas Fleet confined to the
German Bight. Scheer was the only commander of the High Seas Fleet to directly
challenge Jellicoe’s strategy by actively trying to lure the Grand Fleet into battle. After
Jutland, however, he had to wait for his ships to return to full fighting strength before
sending them back out, though he utilized the time to plan a repeated attempt of the May
31 action.
Scheer planned the next sortie to take place in late August of 1916, which he
would execute after the fleet had been repaired and was returned to full strength. The
goal was the same as always: to draw out part of the Grand Fleet and ambush the
unlucky ships, sinking as many as possible. Scheer deployed German zeppelins to
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perform reconnaissance in the North Sea to scout for signs of Grand Fleet ships in
conjunction with twenty-four U-boats deployed from the Dogger Bank and throughout
the southern North Sea. As with his earlier raids against the English coast, Scheer’s
plan called for the battle cruiser fleet to bombard a coastal town to compel portions of
the Grand Fleet to sail against them. Those cruisers would then initiate a chase in
which the unwitting British sailed into firing range of the bulk of the High Seas Fleet.
The timing of the raid was particularly important because Scheer wanted to
maintain pressure on the Grand Seas Fleet to keep up morale within his own battered
fleet. Only two battlecruisers were serviceable after Jutland, so he supplemented the
force with three battleships. The Ostfriesland remained with the bulk of the fleet to
reinforce or ambush the British fleet.57 The German fleet set sail from the Jade river
basin at 10 pm on 18 August 1916, bound for the English town of Sunderland.58 The
plan was that after the bombardment, the fleet would return to the German Bight while
the U-boats remained to engage the Grand Fleet when it entered the area in response.
The British not only had the numerical advantage, but also a superior intelligence
division, known as “Room 40,” which early in the war had obtained German code
books from a sinking ship. Room 40 intercepted and decoded radio messages about
the raid and recalled Admiral Jellicoe from his leave, stripping Scheer from his
element of surprise. Jellicoe sailed with twenty destroyers, five light battle cruisers,
and the 5th Battle Squadron of five fast battleships to scout for Scheer’s vanguard.
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During the voyage south, the Grand Fleet lost the light cruiser HMS Nottingham when
U-52 struck her with three torpedoes.59
At 2:30 P.M on 19 August, the zeppelin L-13 reported the position of the
Grand Fleet along a course that would have led to an engagement in two hours’ time.
Scheer sent Scouting Division and Torpedo Flotilla II ahead for reconnaissance, but
the fleets never encountered each other. The fleet continued to advance until they
reached the minefields to the south of Sunderland around 4:35 pm. Then Scheer
ordered the ships to begin their return journey. He felt that there was no longer a
possibility of encountering the enemy, and it was too late to carry out the
bombardment. 60
During the return trip, the German U-boats and airships continued to report the
presence of the British fleet relative to the Germans. A small British force consisting
of six small cruisers and two destroyer flotillas matched the German fleet’s easterly
course until nightfall. Scheer believed they were close enough to see the smoke
billows from his big ships and felt they were biding their time for a night action. To
his great surprise, there was no night action, and the High Seas Fleet continued to port.
The U-boat U-63 successfully sank another British cruiser, demonstrating the
effectiveness of submarines if deployed in the proper manner.
Aside from the minor victories of the U-boats, the sortie was generally
ineffective. True, Scheer had demonstrated that the British should remain watchful for
any attack by the High Seas Fleet, but the Ostfriesland and the rest of the German
dreadnoughts once again completed a mission without firing their guns. Scheer
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continued to plan and execute sorties against the Grand Fleet throughout the remainder
of 1916 and continued to get the same result. While the Royal Navy retained superior
numbers, they remained in a position to maintain a loose blockade over the German
Bight. Scheer later wrote
the behavior of the enemy after the battle of the Skagerrak showed clearly that he
intended to rely entirely on economic pressure to secure our defeat and would
continue to keep his fleet in the northern waters of the British Isles. Nothing but
serious damage to his own economic life could force this opponent to yield…as
English economic life depended on sea trade, the only means of getting at it was
to overcome the Fleet, or get past it. The former meant the destruction of the
Fleet, which, in view of our relative strength, was not possible.61
With that realization, the role of the surface fleet shifted to U-boat support, and
by the end of 1916 the High Seas Fleet was rethinking its entire naval strategy for the
rest of the war. Obsolete ships were decommissioned, and crews were reorganized to
accommodate the increasing number of U-boats. No longer the focus of the High Seas
Fleet, the powerful dreadnought battleships were redeployed to other posts, and the
Ostfriesland became the guardian of the German Bight, where it served until called to
serve in Operation Albion in October 1917. In September 1917, the German Army
seized control of Riga from the Russian 12th Army, straightening their lines on the
Eastern Front and freeing up troops for redeployment to France. After their victory,
the German Command felt it necessary to clear Russian-held islands in the Baltic
through an amphibious assault with combined army and navy forces. Figure 5 depicts
the German battle plan for clearing the islands in the Gulf of Riga. 62 The Straits of
Irben were guarded by Russian guns at Zerch, making a troop landing on the Island of
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Oesel too hazardous. Consequently, the commanders in charge of the operation chose
the Bay of Tagga for the troops to put ashore, as it was the only bay in the north of
Oesel that could support the large number of transports and provide protection from
the west winds that characterize the Baltic autumn.
Scheer was especially aware of the challenges that such an undertaking presented,
and sought to learn from the British, French, and Anzac experience in the Dardanelles
in 1915. He prepared his fleet to transport 23,000 men, 5,000 horses, and the material
to support them. The assault was an ambitious one, but the Ostfriesland and her sister
ships served as escorts for minesweepers and kept out of direct action.63
The Ostfriesland saw little action in 1918. She led 1st Squadron in the final fleet
advance in April and was assigned to a special unit with the Thüringen and Nassau for
Figure 5: German Sweep of Riga
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a planned invasion of Petrograd. Like many of their previous missions, the operation
was cancelled, and the fleet ordered back to Wilhelmshaven. In October of 1918,
Scheer and Hipper planned one final sortie against the Grand Fleet, in which they
intended to sail the entirety of the High Seas Fleet into a decisive engagement that
would provide Germany with better conditions at the peace negotiations. Ostfriesland
stood ready to sail, but a rash of mutinies stopped the advance before the fleets met.
On 16 December, the German Navy decommissioned the Ostfriesland and put her
in service as an accommodation ship. Following the armistice, the allies allowed
Germany to keep her, but after Admiral Ludwig von Reuter ordered the bulk of the
High Seas Fleet to scuttle their vessels during internment at Scapa Flow, the United
States claimed possession of the Ostfriesland to replace the vessels lost. On 9 April
1920, she became an American ship and sailed across to the Atlantic to begin the
“victory cruise.” On 21 July 1921, the Ostfriesland met her fate when Billy Mitchell’s
pilots dropped 2000-pound bombs on her to prove the efficacy of aerial combat in
naval warfare.

A REFLECTION OF ITS TIME: THE OSTFRIESLAND AS A PRODUCT OF
CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES AND REACTIVE NAVAL STRATEGY

Like many wars, the First World War was reflective of global issues at the
time. Rapid industrialization led to booming economies at the expense of an exploited
proletariat. A growing sense of nationalism helped keep the masses in line, ultimately
contributing to the start of the Great War. Historically, warfare has sparked significant
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advancements in technology, and the Great War was no different. Not only was the
naval arms race and the invention of the Dreadnought significant, but the war also
introduced armored tanks, aerial combat and reconnaissance, chemical warfare, and
machine guns. Each of these advances influenced the designs of all and forced military
strategists to reevaluate traditional notions of warfare. The scale of industrialization
that characterized World War I caused a fundamental shift in tactics and strategy not
experienced since the American Civil War. The Ostfriesland served as a physical
reflection of those shifting strategies and technologies.
The development of the submarine was one of the most significant advances in
naval technology and strategy during the 20th century. The use of submarines as
commerce raiders helps to partially explain the inaction of Germany’s surface fleet,
especially with ships as advanced as the Ostfriesland and her sisters. But even these
advanced weapons went underutilized in the German navy. The development of the
submarine and the use of torpedoes in naval combat are landmarks in the development
of ship-to-ship warfare, but beyond the significance just mentioned they have little
influence on this story. Instead, the major technological shift in which the Ostfriesland
found herself a part, was that from sea to air.
Neville Jones notes in his work The Origins of Strategic Bombing that “the
essence of strategic bombing is the offensive, and the first interest in the flying
machine as a potentially offensive weapon goes back at least to 1907.”64 That year, the
attending members of the second meeting of the Hague Conference decided not to
renew an article ratified in 1899 prohibiting the use of flying machines in dropping
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projectiles and explosives. Those attendees felt that aircraft would inevitably be used
in warfare as auxiliary to ground forces and therefore would be fired upon. They saw
it unfair to deprive them of the means to retaliate. By outfitting aircraft with weapons
for their own defense, it opened the opportunity for offensive use, regardless of intent.
Beyond defense, however, early commanders of the air forces did not perceive
the usefulness of aircraft for service beyond army support. As Jones states “during the
whole of the First World War the greater part of Britain’s air strength was committed
to the tactical support of the British Army on the Western Front.”65 This short-sighted
approach to aircraft applicability stunted the effectiveness and squandered the
potential for a speedy end to the war. The reliance on aircraft in reconnaissance roles
was useful but failed to realize their potential as offensive weapons. When the Royal
Air Force did venture out to attempt air raids, they lacked the technology to affect any
significant damage to the German fleet or industry. An important note to this history is
that it was the Royal Navy who pushed for the development of bombers and all types
of bombing.66 It was the Navy that first conceived of the aircraft as an offensive
weapon, rather than an auxiliary to the land forces. They increased the power of the
engines to carry the weight of the machine guns and bombs they had started equipping
them with, believing them to be the best defense against German air raids.
The Royal Navy’s vision for air power was forward thinking compared to the
Army, which still held on to the notion of aircraft as reconnaissance only. It
appreciated that aircraft required precise navigation to their intended targets as well as
the ability to drop ordinance on their targets accurately, and from varying heights.
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Like ships, air navigation required the ability to determine the speed and direction of
the wind and its effect on the aircraft in flight. This determination to utilize aircraft
against enemy vessels, dockyards, and shore installations led the Navy to develop the
greatest technological advancements in aeronautics during the First World War.
By 1913, the Navy had made significant advancements in aerial warfare and
when war finally broke out the role of the airplane as an offensive weapon was well
established. Though strategic bombing was far from effective during the Great War, in
part because of the limited vision of the commanders, it still presented enough of a
threat to facilitate a response from the German Imperial Navy. The balance of air
power leading up to the war was solidly in Germany’s favor, and had they utilized
their Zeppelin fleet to attack the English coast early in the war, they may have caused
panic and shock to morale in the country. Instead, the German Army also viewed air
power through a lens of ground support and lost three of their nine Zeppelins in their
first flights over the combat zone.67 Their lack of ambition for their Zeppelin fleet
allowed time for Britain to strengthen its air wing and deploy its planes in support of
the Belgian coast in the first months of the war. While the role of aircraft remained
largely auxiliary in nature, the tactical and strategic requirements of the war led to the
Allied and Associated Powers developing planes with offensive capabilities.
Before the fall of Antwerp on 9 October 1914, the British used the city as a
base from which their planes performed sorties against Germany’s airship sheds at
Cologne and Düsseldorf, representing the first use of aircraft against German forces.
They carried out the first raid in September of 1914, to limited effect. Only one pilot
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found his target, and few of the bombs he dropped detonated as intended. The second
British raid was conducted in October, on the day the British and civilians evacuated
Antwerp. The pilot sent to Düsseldorf dropped his payload from six hundred feet and
destroyed the zeppelin shed and the airship inside of it. The pilot sent to Cologne
failed to find the airship yard so instead dropped his bombs on the railway station in
the center of town.68
Though the effectiveness was still miniscule compared to what air power
would achieve in future wars, the early British raids still provoked German reactions.
In October of 1914, Germany captured the Belgian coastal towns of Ostend and
Zeebrugge, providing them access to both close and long range British commerce. In
response to the threat to their supply chain, the British Admiralty bolstered its force of
planes near Dunkirk to constantly harass the German naval bases. The timing would
suggest a German reaction, as that same month the Ostfriesland traded in two of her
14cm guns in favor of two 8.8cm Flak guns for anti-air defense. The simple exchange
is indicative of the growing influence of air power on the design and armament of
naval warships. The influence was subtle, but significant in hindsight. The raids
demonstrated the potential threat to naval and military facilities, prompting ships to
undergo refits, but the commanders of both naval and air forces continued to see
airplanes as little more than auxiliary to ground forces.
Despite the use of aircraft as auxiliary to the army, the Royal Navy utilized its
own aircraft in a series of raids against German Zeppelin bases. It is significant that
the Navy was the first branch to aggressively deploy aircraft, as it would be admirals
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in the United States Navy who proved to be General Mitchell’s most vocal opponents
during his bomb trials. The resolution to this apparent contradiction may lie in the
chosen target of the naval raids. Rather than targeting the fleets, the Royal Navy pilots
sought to destroy German Zeppelins and their support facilities. Yes, the Navy used
planes offensively, but only against other air services and crews.
Though aware of the British predilection to target their Zeppelin force, the
German navy equipped its surface ships with Flak cannons to defend against aerial
assault. The battleship, especially those of the dreadnought design, remained the
backbone of any battle fleet, but the possibility of air raids was finally presenting
enough of a threat to warrant refits and redesigns. Shortly after the Ostfriesland
received her own 8cm Flak guns, the Royal Navy executed its fourth raid against
Germany’s Zeppelin sheds. On Christmas Day 1914, seven British seaplanes left from
three seaplane tenders,69 supported by a force of cruisers and destroyers, to attack the
Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven.
Typical December weather characterized the North Sea during that Christmas
raid, which made visual location of the sheds difficult. Seaman Stumpf noted in his
journal that “the extremely heavy fog prevented me from seeing anything, but I could
hear the noise of their motors quite distinctly.”70 The fact that the Ostfriesland and her
sister ships opened fire from their recently acquired anti-aircraft guns demonstrated
the growing acceptance of airpower as a viable threat, although none at the time
expressed concern for the damage British planes might do to the fleet.
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A common characteristic that heralds major shifts in attitudes and technology
is the official denial of the impending technology being viable accompanied with the
practical implementation of reactionary methods to it. In the 19th century, admirals and
sailors refused to accept the applicability of steam for anything other than auxiliary to
sail, but the American Civil War demonstrated the strategic and tactical advantages of
steam when applied independently. The result was one of the largest technological
leaps in human history, and an increase in pressure for industrialized maritime powers
to acquire global territories to serve as coaling stations for their growing steam navies.
The development of heavier-than-air flight in 1903 sparked a similar debate in which
planes were accepted for their auxiliary uses as support for ground forces, but
acceptance of their independent applicability was not accepted until they proved their
worth during wartime. The Great War provided them the opportunity to convince key
strategists of their usefulness.
Scheer wrote of the usefulness of seaplanes in his memoir and described the
development of bases for air support throughout German-held territory, including the
captured Belgian port towns of Zeebrugge and Ostend. He praised the commanders of
the Naval Air Service with developing their branch to a degree that “rendered [the
fleet] invaluable services as scouts, thereby relieving the fighting forces on the water a
great burden.”71 Though still included as an arm of the Navy, the air service was
slowly earning its place as an asset to naval operations. Not only did both the British
and Germans expand their seaplane bases, but Germany also began converting cruisers
to seaplane carriers and expanding the role of their air forces in general.

71

Scheer, 201.

50

Great increases in technology and industrialized warfare characterized the
Great War. As demonstrated previously, the naval arms race between Britain and
Germany led to enormous advancements in battleship construction, primarily in
accordance with the arguments asserted by A.T. Mahan and the accepted notion of the
battleship as the backbone of the battle fleet. Yet the war also saw the development of
heavier-than-air flight and the evolution of planes from unarmed scouts to offensive
weapons engaged in bombing missions and dogfights. Ironically, the Royal Navy was
the first service to deploy aircraft offensively, while still asserting that they would be
useless against enemy naval vessels.
The Great War was an experiment of sorts in which new technologies were
deployed in compliance with old schools of thought. Air power in 1914 was in its
infancy, and the Great War nurtured it into a healthy adolescence. Within the first year
or two of the war, planes had moved away from their reconnaissance and support roles
and toward independent combat units that helped determine the outcome of many of
the war’s battles. The winter of 1916-1917 witnessed Germany’s greatest expansion of
her air forces. In September of 1916, she began with only seven Albatross D III
biplanes, expanding rapidly to a total of four hundred and thirty-four by May 1917.72
The rapid expansion of the superior planes securely placed aerial superiority in
German cockpits, and the rigid training and organization of the German air service
allowed them to operate in a much more effective way than their British counterparts.
As German biplanes took to the air in tight-knit formations, air groups within
the British Army remained constricted to roles resembling cavalry reconnaissance
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divisions. Like cavalry squadrons, air groups could defend themselves and perform
raids, but their raison d’être was collecting information. Such restriction of operation
retarded the potential of the aircraft as an efficient weapon of war. The Royal Navy
came the closest to realizing the full potential of aircraft as offensive weapons, and in
1918 they launched the first carrier-based raid in history, when seven Sopwith Camels
took off from the flight deck of the HMS Furious to attack the German Zeppelin base
at Tondern.73
American Brigadier-General William Mitchell arrived in Europe just as the
United States entered the War in the spring of 1917. What he witnessed in the Allied
air services convinced him of the importance of air power to the future of warfare.
Many in the top echelons of command failed to grasp the lessons of the Great War, but
Mitchell saw the aeroplane as a herald of a changing world. In his view, command of
the sea was no longer the deciding factor in war. Rather, he argued that “no navies can
operate on the seas, nor armies on the land, until the air forces have first attained a
decision against the opposing air forces, so as to allow those on the water to operate
against their enemy.”74The Ostfriesland saw little of the air war during her active
service, but the addition of anti-air defense batteries demonstrated the influence air
power was gaining. By Scheer’s own account, the High Seas Fleet relied heavily on
Zeppelins and sea planes to scout for the Grand Fleet and provide intelligence
information to the surface ships. When the war ended in 1918, the use of airplanes in a
military capacity had rapidly moved beyond simple scouting and ground support and
well into offensive engagements of both air and ground targets.
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At the close of the Great War, the Allied and Associate Powers began
downsizing their militaries to defensive forces, dramatically reducing the size of their
fleets and air services, while taking much of Germany’s from them as reparation for
the extensive blood they spilled across all fronts. Germany agreed to intern her
greatest warships at Scapa Flow during peace negotiations, but the Ostfriesland, no
longer the top-of-the line battleship, remained in German hands as a barracks ship.75
When Admiral Ludwig von Reuter scuttled the ships under his command, the allies
seized the Ostfriesland to replace those irretrievable at Scapa Flow. For a brief period
between the end of the Great War and her sinking of the Virginia coast, the
Ostfriesland was commissioned as a United States naval vessel. Figure 5 depicts the
ship in the New York Navy Yard flying the American flag while undergoing studies
from U.S. Navy inspectors. 76 Though the Ostfriesland’s war record as a German
battleship had come to an end, she proved to be a key factor in the argument between
air and sea.
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Figure 6: The Ostfriesland under an American Flag in the New York Drydock
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CHAPTER 4

BILLY MITCHELL AND THE VICTORY FLEET

William Mitchell’s military career began at the age of eighteen when he
enlisted with a volunteer regiment to serve in the Spanish American War in 1898. The
grandson of a wealthy banker and railroad king, and the son of a United States
Senator, Mitchell spent a significant portion of his youth with “horses and guns.”77
His family’s influence helped secure him a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the
Army, and his jovial personality helped gain him the attention of senators and
commanders like William Jennings Bryan and Major General Adolphus Greely, the
Chief Signal Officer of the Army. Even at eighteen, Mitchell understood the ease with
which he secured his commission had more to do with influence than merit. 78
Ironically, Mitchell built his career in an Army that was rapidly reorganizing
into an expansionary force to assert the United States growing imperialist ambitions
that Mitchell’s own father vocally opposed on the Senate floor.79 As an officer in the
Signal Corps, Mitchell spent most of the war in Florida, but managed to make it to
Cuba in time to see the transfer of power from Spain, which had controlled those
waters for four centuries, to the United States, a rising power in the changing world. 80
While Senator Mitchell ardently opposed expansionist bills that crossed his desk,
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Lieutenant Mitchell enthusiastically embraced the mission to show the American flag
around the world.81 When the inhabitants of the Philippines challenged American
annexation, Mitchell volunteered for transfer to that station, and arrived at the start of
a two-year campaign to quell the islanders.
Mitchell’s service in the Philippines provided him with the experience
necessary to become the youngest Captain in the Army at the age of twenty-four. His
position as Captain in the Signal Corps exposed Mitchell to numerous technologies,
including the telephone and telegraph, dirigible, and airplane. His post at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, then known as the intellectual hub of the Army, afforded him
experience with several of these cutting-edge technologies, and in 1906 he published
his first article concerning air power, though in it he discussed the dirigible.82 Alfred
Hurley notes in his biography that Mitchell did not participate in the Signal Corps
early aeronautical work. The Signal Corps didn’t formalize the Aeronautical Division
until 1907 and didn’t receive its first air plane until 1908. By 1913, it only had six
planes and one dirigible. Hurley claimed that “Mitchell himself never expressed any
ambition to fly before 1916. Thus, his remarks about military ballooning suggested no
more than the range of his active mind at a time when a fast-moving technical
revolution was challenging the entire Army, and the Signal Corps in particular.”83
After Leavenworth, Mitchell gained acceptance to the School of the Line
(formerly the Infantry and Cavalry School) where his instructors labelled him a
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Distinguished Graduate and selected him for admission to the Staff College. His
training at those schools demonstrated the extent to which the Army was reorganized
from a service designed for the subjugation of Native Americans to a global force
designed for colonization and expansion. The school’s curriculum “emphasized the
preparation of the student body for mass warfare,” and Mitchell applied the lessons he
learned there to his career.84
Mitchell returned to the Philippines for his next tour of duty where he applied
his training to a reconnaissance mission in which he monitored Japanese activities in
the areas between Formosa and the Philippines. He expanded his study of the Japanese
military to battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War and Russian and Japanese forces.
He drafted a report of his findings to the War College Division of the General Staff
where he outlined his belief that war with Japan was inevitable and the Philippines
were in great danger of falling into Japanese hands.85 His was an extreme
interpretation but not an uncommon one. Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 had
shaken America and her allies and convinced them that Japan was a greater threat to
their Pacific possessions than Germany.
His report aligned with the views of many military commanders, including
Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood.
The two influential men wanted an army with a regular component of 100,000 soldiers
and a trained reserve to support it. Mitchell’s harmony with his superiors’ views of a
large standing army contributed to his selection for duty with the organization of a
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regular and volunteer force.86 His post to the General Staff sent him to Washington,
D.C. where he was determined to build the necessary political partnerships that would
insure his path to the rank of General. At the age of thirty-four, Mitchell was fully
committed to a career in the military, the only place he felt he could match the record
of his father and grandfather.87
Mitchell’s experience in the Signal Corps convinced him that the rapid
advance of science was bringing global transportation to the point where distance
could soon be measured in time, rather than miles. The rate at which technology was
advancing served to shape Mitchell’s views of the usefulness of aircraft, and in 1913
he began to listen to the aviators of the Aeronautical Division who maintained that an
independent aviation service would produce more advances than one under the
purview of the Signal Corps. In 1913, however, Mitchell and future legends in
aviation like Lieutenant Henry “Hap” Arnold testified in front of a Congressional
hearing that aviation and the Signal Corps were best suited to each other. At that point,
Mitchell still viewed aviation as little more than an instrument of reconnaissance,
which made it ideal to the Signal Corps communications system.88
When the Great War began in Europe, Mitchell monitored the early action with
immense interest. Hurley has compared Mitchell’s interest in the Great War to George
McClellan’s role as an observer during the Crimean War. McClellan used his
experience to claim a key position as a Union General at the outbreak of the Civil
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War, despite lacking the aggression and daring of his Confederate counterparts.
Anticipating America’s entry into the European conflict, Mitchell hoped to gain a post
as an observer in Europe. He hoped the role would lead to his holding a key position at
the outbreak of America’s next war, as it had done for McClellan. With an eye on
hostilities, the Wilson Administration issued a call for assessments of national defense
in the event the war reached American shores and requested proposals for defense
preparations. In one such proposal, Mitchell presented what Hurley called the “earliest
comprehensive statements of American military aviation policy and an excellent
statement of aeronautical thinking at this time.”89 The proposal called for continued
attachment of aviation with the Signal Corps. The Air Service would serve as a second
line of defense in case the Navy failed to keep the enemy from American shores.
The proposal retained the notions of an air service as auxiliary to more
traditional and well-established ground forces. Attached to coastal defenses, the Signal
Corps could deploy aircraft as spotters to enhance the accuracy of artillery. Flyers
could also engage enemy aircraft offensively, destroying airships, attacking
submarines, and disrupting minelaying operations. The situation became more
convincing when the aircraft supporting General John J. Pershing’s pursuit of Pancho
Villa fell apart due to the rugged conditions of the Mexican desert.90 The wooden
propellers dried out and cracked under the southwest heat, and their engines could not
perform efficiently in the mountainous terrain.91 Convinced of the need for better
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planes, Congress allocated $500,000, followed by the enormous sum of $13,281,666
for the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps.92
Mitchell’s position in the General Staff began to wear on him physically,
causing such ailments as eye strain and rheumatism. The absence of physical activity
he had enjoyed in his youth contributed to health problems, and his superiors judged
his temperament to be better suited for active field service rather than desk work. As
an officer of the Signal Corps, the Aviation Division represented Mitchell’s only
opportunity for the field service he had always wanted. In July 1915, Mitchell
achieved promotion to Major and transferred to the Aviation Section where he threw
himself into the task of building up Army aviation.
His first task was to improve pilot training, and there he had his first encounter
with the types of conflicting interests that would characterize his post-war career. One
of the chief interests in aviation training in the early 20th century was the Aero Club of
America, which wanted the government to focus pilot training on National
Guardsmen. Mitchell and his colleagues preferred to increase the training of active
duty flyers. Eventually, Secretary of War Newton Baker sided with Mitchell and he
continued training pilots in the manner he saw fit.
Mitchell’s proximity to pilot training inspired him to learn the skill himself
when off duty. Although Congress had authorized officers like Mitchell to fly they had
not allocated funds to pay for their training. As a result, Mitchell paid for his own
training at Curtiss Aviation School in Newport News, Virginia. The expense of
$1,470, paid off in January of 1917 when the War Department decided to send an
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officer to Europe as an aeronautical observer. Mitchell secured the position and
departed for France in March 1917, at a point in the war when German-American
relations were rapidly disintegrating in response to Germany’s unrestricted submarine
warfare campaign. The following month Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of
war against Imperial Germany.
Upon arrival in France, Mitchell immediately took an intensive aeronautical
course to catch up to the Allied airmen. By listening to what they said, and more
importantly observing what they did, Mitchell became convinced that American
aviation was sorely underdeveloped and underappreciated in the United States.93
Mitchell’s exposure to the performance and daring of French pilots during the Great
War demonstrated to him the tremendous tasks American aviation faced to reach the
same level, as well as the importance and potential of aviation as a military force. He
arrived at a time when French and English aeronautics had advanced to include
fighters and bombers in an offensive force that operated efficiently and effectively
after two years of combat trials. The level of organization of planes and their pilots
developed by the Allies during wartime highlighted the academic amateurism with
which the United States pursued air power, and left Mitchell wanting to explore the
depth to which European aeronautics had advanced. Disregarding the objections of
French Command, Mitchell spent ten days under fire and was the first American pilot
to fly over German lines.94
Historians have recounted Mitchell’s experiences as an American observer in
several books. It is not necessary to retell that story here. Suffice to say, Mitchell’s
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experiences on the Front during the spring and summer of 1917 thoroughly convinced
him of the importance of air power, and in the wake of Versailles he became a vocal
proponent of building an independent air force that would assume the role of
America’s first line of defense. He firmly believed that for a nation to control the land
or sea, it must first obtain control of the air above the other fronts. His pursuit for a
more powerful and independent air service would consume him during the interwar
period, and with the surrender of the German warships at Scapa Flow, and the
Ostfriesland to replace those scuttled by Reuter, Mitchell had the perfect targets with
which to test his theories.
Mitchell’s most vocal and ardent opponents in his quest to develop an
independent air force were leaders in the U.S. Navy. The rivalry began on Mitchell’s
transit back to the United States when he was on board the Cunard liner Aquitania
with Lieutenant Commander (Lt. Cdr.) Jarome C. Hunsaker, the Navy’s leading
authority on aircraft design. Hunsaker had just completed service with the Allied
Naval Armistice Commission, which investigated German naval aviation and oversaw
the surrender of German aircraft under the terms of the armistice. Despite their mutual
interest in aviation, Hunsaker didn’t like Mitchell, referring to him as a “‘politician in
uniform,’ ‘charming’ in some ways but with a certain ‘asinine quality.’”95 In the latest
study of Mitchell’s rivalry with the Navy, Thomas Wildenberg spoke of the Aquitania
voyage as the initial planting of the seeds of enmity between Mitchell and the rival
aviation service. Wildenberg describes the aviator’s passion and resolve as the
catalyzing element:
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Mitchell expounded at length on the lessons of the war and the importance of
an independent air force to anyone within earshot. The general and his cohorts,
Hunsaker recalled, were “fully prepared with evidence, plans, data, propaganda
posters and articles to break things wide open for air power as the sole
requisite of the national defense in the future.’ Mitchell’s rhetoric spelled
danger for the Navy and for naval aviation in particular.96
After Mitchell’s return to the States, the military underwent a period of
reorganization in which President Wilson’s executive order abolished the Military
Aviation Division and put the civilian Bureau of Aircraft Production under the
director of the Air Service, “who was to have all powers conferred by law and
executive order that had previously been accorded the director of Aircraft
Production.”97 In the wake of the reorganization, Mitchell was assigned to the staff of
the director of the Air Service as assistant executive in charge of the Training and
Operations Division.
In his new position, Mitchell relentlessly dispatched suggestions and requests
for aeronautical developments to director of the Air Service Major General Charles T.
Menoher, who dismissed many of them, not because they were bad ideas, but because
unlike Mitchell, Menoher realized that the General Staff would not authorize the
exorbitant expenses such advancements would entail. In the early 20th century, the
practice of nations in peace was to reduce the size of the military to defensive level.
Mitchell’s suggestions for expansion, research, and development ran counter to those
policies, impeding the level of advancement Mitchell hoped to achieve.
In addition to his rivals in the Navy, Mitchell faced other opponents in his
quest to expand airpower, these more familiar and of the type that had existed
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frequently during periods of technological and social advancement. On his side were
the aviators and supporters of air power, who agreed with Mitchell’s assessment that
the air opened a new battlefield that would characterize future wars. Even naval
aviators agreed with Mitchell on this point. But there remained the traditionalists, nonflyers who stubbornly clung to the writings of Nelson and Mahan and steadfastly
believed the airplane was useless for anything other than auxiliary service to ground
and sea forces. Wildenberg noted that “the nature of the controversy differed
somewhat between the services. In the Army, the issue [centered] around the status of
the airmen and the establishment of a separate air arm. Naval aviators were also
concerned about their status, but their first priority was to obtain aircraft carriers,
which was essential if aircraft were to accompany the fleet.”98
The rivalry with the Navy was partially genuine, but also designed to combat
the traditionalists and convince Congress of the importance of air power in national
defense. To that end, the General Board of the Navy, the advisory body of senior flag
officers who reported to the Secretary of the Navy on matters of policy and ship
construction, called Mitchell to appear at a hearing questioning whether the coastline
should remain the dividing line between Army and Naval authority over national
defense. Mitchell’s belief in a singular air service convinced the Board to call him to
testify, and much of the discussion revolved around the “types and numbers of planes
that might be transferred to the Army as the Navy demobilized.”99 This hearing was
the first instance in which the Navy or Mitchell raised the subject of surface ship
vulnerability, and both sides agreed that they would have to perform tests to
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adequately determine the applicability of aircraft, or vulnerability of naval craft, in
such a contest.100 At some point in the hearing, Mitchell lectured the flag officers on
the necessity of fighter escorts for observation craft and the inadequacy of floatplane
squadrons, which placed him solidly in favor of naval aviators who were pushing for
the development of the Navy’s first aircraft carrier.
Though naval aviators agreed with Mitchell’s desire for a more developed
aeronautical force, the new director of Naval Aviation Captain Thomas T. Craven
believed that the Navy should design, develop, and deploy its planes in conjunction
with other naval forces, just as any ship or weapon. Craven did not deny the notion
that a unified air service would advance aeronautics more rapidly than divided
services, but he felt deployment of those forces during wartime would be inefficient in
terms of achieving victory. In response, Mitchell devised a plan for the deployment of
aircraft carriers under a unified air service and called for two such craft with ninehundred-foot decks. His goal in wartime was first to achieve air superiority through
the destruction of enemy air forces, which was a concept that naval aviators had not
yet considered.
Mitchell’s rivalry with the Navy hit full stride when he testified in front of a
Military Affairs committee concerned with the reorganization of the armed services in
the post war period. The committee was especially concerned with the fate of the air
services, which were in danger of being completely dissolved. Mitchell’s August 20
1919 testimony drew the proverbial line in the sand when he declared “we believe that
if we are allowed to develop essentially air weapons [as a] means of fighting in the air
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that we can carry the war to such an extent in the air as to almost make navies useless
on the surface of the waters. The Navy General Board I might say agrees with me on
that.”101
In 1919, Mitchell and the Navy were solidly at odds with each other. Mitchell
continued to push for a unified air force that would have final administration over all
aviation, even carriers at sea. The flag officers of the Navy, as well as Acting
Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt, argued that naval aviation should
remain a division of the Navy and the training of pilots, construction of planes, and
deployment of aircraft carriers, should remain under the purview of the Navy. As the
House Military Affairs Committee met in 1920 to discuss the Army Appropriation Bill
for 1921, Mitchell again attacked the Navy, claiming that all aircraft for coastal
defense should be solely under the direction of the Army Air Service, and that naval
aviation should be restricted to the fleet. In his testimony, Mitchell exaggerated the
facts by stating that the Air Service was developing planes capable of dropping five
1,000-pound bombs on battleships. He argued that the aerial bomb possessed more
destructive power as a percentage of its total weight than shells, torpedoes, or mines,
making it the ideal weapon for use against surface vessels. At the time, the Air Service
was in the process of developing a plane capable of carrying a 5,000-pound payload,
but its best plane in service was the Martin bomber, which had a max load of 1,040
pounds. Yet Mitchell willingly stretched that detail to challenge the Navy once again
by claiming that the Air Service would render the fleet obsolete if given the chance. 102
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In his quest for an independent air force under his command, Mitchell waged
an outright public relations war against the Navy in the early 1920s. Aviators like
Mitchell and Hunsaker had to fight for funding from a Congress seeking to cut costs to
a military in the process of peace-time reorganization. To justify the expenditure
attached to pursuits in aviation, be they naval or army, Congress required a test of the
applicability of air power against naval forces. Wildenberg impeccably described
Mitchell’s reaction to the test requirement by pointing out that he “was so audaciously
sure of himself that he immediately set in motion plans for sinking one of the naval
service’s cherished icons of sea power.”103 Understanding that his most threatening
opponent during peace was the Navy, Mitchell was determined to prove the
superiority of his vision of an air force as more advantageous than the traditional naval
approach.
Mitchell had begun his public relations campaign to gain public support for
increased funding of the Air Service toward the end of summer 1920. He understood
that for people to recognize the importance of aviation to national defense, he had to
first get them interested. He knew at the start that the public still believed the Navy to
be the nation’s first line of defense, a viewpoint that had helped secure funding in
1916 for the Navy’s largest expansion bill in its history.104 Mitchell was well aware of
Congress’s inclination to reduce spending in the post-war years, and felt that the
service most capable of coastal defense would receive the most funding. He argued
that once the initial cost of building 2000 planes had been allocated, the annual upkeep
thereafter would not exceed the upkeep of more than one or two battleships.
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The question of an aerial test was not a novel one at the time. The Navy had a
long tradition of using its obsolete warships to test its most advanced weapons. The
goal of those tests was to identify the most vulnerable points in ship construction, so
they might be reinforced in the next generation of warships. In mid-October of 1920,
the Navy scheduled such a test against the obsolete battleship Indiana. The goal of the
tests was to determine the potential effects of aerial bombing against battleships and
determine the best course to strengthen surface vessels against such an attack. The
Navy invited four Army officers, including Mitchell, to observe the bombing trials.
The final test was to detonate an 1800-pound bomb filled with nine hundred pounds of
amatol explosive placed on the port side of the superstructure next to the 8-inch
barbette. The explosion caused a gaping hole through the main deck, blew out most of
the superstructure, toppled the forward smokestack, and damaged the barbette. Having
witnessed the detonation first hand, Mitchell was convinced that a single 1,800pounder could sink the toughest ship in service on the ocean.
The day after the tests, retired Rear Admiral Fullam published an article in the
New York Tribune on the future of naval warfare. In the article, Fullam praised the
development of aircraft and extolled the advances in submarines, mines, and
torpedoes, which he believed would facilitate a revolution in battleship design and
prevent the transportation of large armies overseas.105 In his conclusion, Fullam
asserted that sea power would continue its influence on history, but would now have to
control the air above them.
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Ever the opportunist, Mitchell used Fullam’s arguments to fuel his propaganda
war against the Navy. In the months leading up to his own bomb tests, he exploited the
purpose of the Indiana tests and manipulated the findings to his own ends. Where the
purpose of the tests was to determine how best to strengthen future ship designs
against aerial attack, Mitchell highlighted those findings as indicative of the
vulnerability of surface ships against aerial bombardment.106 By pushing that
information into the public, Mitchell effectively “wrested the initiative from the Navy
and shifted the burden of proof to the sea service.”107
The public relations war between Mitchell and the Navy had generated so
much interest in the bomb tests that the potential for experimental data had become
irrelevant. High ranking officials within the Navy went as far as to assert their
confidence in the failure of the aerial attacks that they would “be perfectly willing to
be on board [the Iowa] when they bomb her.”108 The public saw the statement as a
challenge, and from that point the aircraft-v-battleship argument became a win-or-lose
contest. Nothing else mattered beyond the question of whether aerial bombardment
could sink a battleship.
The public interest in the aerial bomb tests provided the necessary support for
Senator Henry New, a strong supporter of aviation, to increase pressure on Secretary
of the Navy Josephus Daniels to provide test vessels for the experiment. On February
9, 1921, New introduced a joint resolution to the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs directing Daniels to supply obsolete vessels to the Air Service for use in
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conducting extensive aerial bomb tests. Daniels’ reply on February 24 indicated that
he had already issued orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet to conduct
bombing experiments on the German ships surrendered at the close of the Great War
and invited the Army to participate.109
The terms of the Versailles Treaty that authorized the transfer of German
warships to the United States stipulated that the vessels be “rendered useless for
military purposes and then destroyed.”110 After their capitulation, German sailors
sabotaged the vessels before surrender in a last act of defiance. When U.S. Navy
personnel took possession of the vessels at Rosyth, their first task was to assess the
damage and repair as much of it as possible before their transit across the Atlantic.
The engines of the U-boats had been badly damaged, but Navy submariners repaired
them enough to make the transit. The destroyers had been gutted and so extensively
damaged that they had to be towed across the sea to the United States. The
Ostfriesland had been sabotaged, but Navy crews were able to repair her to a level of
serviceability in which they sailed her to American shores under her own power.111
The Bureau of Ordnance officially authorized the use of the surrendered ships as bomb
targets on February 28, 1920. The Navy drafted a series of proposals to demonstrate
the destructive power of various bomb sizes against several ex-German warships. The
aerial tests would be conducted against the U-boat U-117, the torpedo boat destroyer
G-102, the light battlecruiser Frankfurt, and the Ostfriesland.
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A year after the Bureau of Ordnance’s official sanction of bomb tests against
the German ships, the Joint Aeronautical Board approved the final experiment design
for the bomb tests against the surrendered vessels. The exercises were designed to
determine:
1. The ability of aircraft to locate vessels operating in the Coastal Zone and to
concentrate on such vessels sufficient bombing airplanes to make an
effective attack.
2. The probability of hitting with bombs from airplanes a vessel underway
and capable of maneuvering but incapable of antiaircraft fire.
3. The damage to vessels of comparatively recent design which will result
from hits with bombs of various types and weights. The vessels to be
attacked by bombing are battleship, light cruiser, destroyer, and submarine
types.112
The authorization of a research design and transfer of ex-German warships for
use in aerial bombardment demonstrated the effectiveness of Mitchell’s public
relations war against the Navy. Mitchell’s true target was not the German ships and
their destruction, but the Navy itself. If Mitchell’s pilots and bombers successfully
demonstrated the vulnerability of battleships against an aerial attack, naval aviation
and the Navy’s position as the nation’s first line of defense would be jeopardized.113
By April of 1921, the bitter rivalry between Mitchell and the Navy had reached
such an intensity that President Warren G. Harding felt the need to intervene. In an
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official address to Congress, he sided with the Navy when he remarked “aviation is
inseparable from either the Army or the Navy…and I recommend the establishment of
a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy Department to centralize control of naval
activities in aeronautics.”114 Harding’s official recommendation severely undermined
Mitchell’s quest for a unified Air Service under his command, which would be
virtually impossible once a Bureau of Aeronautics was officially created. His best
chance to regain the lost prospects was through the bomb tests.115
The Navy’s bomb tests featured the most complicated research design in the
AirService’s long history of experimentation. Mitchell was to command the Army Air
Service, but the final command authority was the Commander-in-chief of the Atlantic
Fleet. The Navy wanted observers to board the German vessels after each test to assess
the damage of the varying degrees of bombs. Newspaper photographers and
correspondents would be present, creating an added layer of logistical difficulties for
which the naval commander-in-chief was responsible. The issue that Mitchell found
most absurd was the fact that the Army and Navy Air Forces were supposed to work
together, but with the former under Mitchell’s command and the latter under the
Navy’s command. He firmly believed that command of the air forces, in general but
especially for this particular experiment, should be under his command and not
divided. Division of command for the aeronautical element presented too many
conflicts of interest to effectively execute the plan.116
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Further debate arose over the types of bombs Mitchell could use in the
experiments. The Navy agreed that the planes should use multiple bomb sizes and
types to gather the most diverse range of data possible. Through careful study and
analysis of previous tests, the Navy Department set limitations on the sizes and types
Mitchell could use. Prior to the limitations, Mitchell had ordered the Ordnance
Department to develop an experimental 2,000-pound bomb for use specifically against
a battleship, but Commander Thomas R. Kurtz argued that everyone knew that a
2,000-pounder could sink a battleship, but use of a bomb that size would render the
whole experiment useless.117 Mitchell was indignant at what the controlling and
restrictive orders of the Navy Department in what he believed should be strictly an Air
Service test, and he continued his propaganda war with the Navy right up to the day of
the tests.
In his 1925 book, Winged Defense, Mitchell wrote that the Navy commanders
considered the trial to be “utterly useless, because they reasoned it was entirely
impossible to sink, or even injure, a battleship.”118 Mitchell knew that while the tests
included the smaller, lightly armored craft like submarines, cruisers, and destroyers,
the weight of his reputation and the future of aeronautics in the U.S. military relied
solely on the performance of his planes against the Ostfriesland. The successful
destruction of the smaller boats was not without merit, as Mitchell points out that their
sinking demonstrated “conclusively that planes could sink merchantmen, transports, or

117
118

Wildenberg, 65.
Mitchell, Winged Defense, 56.

73

any kind of a vessel not protected by armor,” which would prove useful in harassing
enemy commerce during wartime.119
The important precursor to the Ostfriesland test was the bombing of the cruiser
Frankfurt, which possessed considerable hull and deck armor as well as watertight
compartments to withstand considerable punishment from the Grand Fleet of the
Royal Navy. The July 18th test provided the opportunity to demonstrate the destructive
effects of multiple sizes of bombs, and after each successive test, observation crews
boarded the vessel to assess the destructive potential of each size of bomb.
Accompanying the official reports of the damage Mitchell and his pilots inflicted is
video footage taken by one of the observation planes, which depicts the tests with
remarkable clarity. As the bombs of varying sizes fell on and around the Frankfurt, the
observation plane captured the extent that the shrapnel and fragments of steel were
thrown by the force of the explosions. Mitchell wryly reflected on the implication of
these tests when he later wrote “it made one think what might happen in case a real
attack was made against naval vessels in war, whether the crews could be held to their
posts in view of almost certain destruction.”120
With the successful destruction of the German warships, Mitchell prepared his
planes for their final assault on the Ostfriesland, the keystone target of his tests. The
gravity of this test was not lost on Mitchell who knew that to secure a future for his
Air Service and keep his argument for a unified Air Force alive, they “had to kill, lay
out and bury this great ship in order that our people could appreciate what tremendous
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power the air held over battleships.”121 The Ostfriesland represented one of the most
advanced warships of her time, and with her relatively recent service, she was not as
obsolete as many of the Navy’s traditional test subjects. Germany built her in
accordance with Mahan’s gospel of sea power to be a tough nut to crack. She was
designed to contend with the dreadnoughts of Fisher’s Grand Fleet, and Mitchell was
determined to use her to demonstrate the supremacy of airpower in military tactics and
technology.
The conditions of the test are important to the public relations war that
continued to surround Mitchell and the Navy observers. Mitchell’s primary purpose
was to prove that a battleship as tough as the Ostfriesland was vulnerable to aerial
bombardment. To make his point, the Ostfriesland was moored and abandoned,
presenting a completely unthreatening target for Mitchell’s planes to focus. None of
the features that made her formidable were serviceable in the test. Enemy sailors did
not man her, she was not able to fire back in defense, nor was she even allowed to
present a moving target. Her only defense against Mitchell’s bombs were those
inherent in her construction, namely, her thick armor plating. With the ship
handicapped in such a way to provide the most vulnerable target possible, Mitchell
still stressed the need to sink her, as failure to do so would severely hinder his
argument for the superiority of air power.
The bombing of the Ostfriesland began on the afternoon of 20 July, after a
slight weather delay, with the deployment of small caliber bombs. Five Marine Corps
DH-4s and two three-plane divisions of Navy F-5Ls began dropping thirty-three 230-
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lb bombs on the Ostfriesland at 1:39pm.122 Once the first bombing run had finished,
the Board of Observers stationed on the USS Shawmut boarded the Ostfriesland to
assess the damage. At 2:05 pm Captain Alfred W. Johnson ordered the Army to send
its fourth squadron of Martin bombers to begin their run, which would include the use
of 600-lb bombs. The time needed for transit from the airfield to the ship would
provide ample time for the observers to assess the damage and return to the Shawmut
before the next bombardment began. Unknown to Johnson, however, a flight of five
MB-2s had breached protocol and left Langley Field at 1:36 pm with a payload of
twelve 600-lb bombs.123 Wildenberg argues that the breach in protocol was
characteristic of Mitchell, who often disregarded his non-aviator superiors, willfully
placing his own goals above those of the Navy. When the flight arrived on site, the
observers were still aboard the Ostfriesland, and the flight commander Captain Walter
R. Lawson radioed to the Shawmut that his flight had only forty minutes of fuel
remaining. Lawson’s breach of protocol caused his flight to arrive before the
scheduled third test bombers, and the worsening weather and their declining fuel
forced Captain Johnson’s hand. Lawson’s planes dropped their eleven 600-pounders
one at a time, but only one successfully stuck the Ostfriesland, damaging the starboard
side of the forecastle.124
Mitchell wrote later that he knew full well that any bomb under 1,100-lb would
be insufficient to sink the Ostfriesland. When the Board of Observers surveyed the
results of the bomb tests at the end of the day, they confirmed as much. Only the 600-
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lb bomb dropped by Lawson’s planes caused any noticeable damage below decks,
having put the two six-inch ammunition hoists out of commission. The powerful
ship’s armor protected her from any significant topside damage, but the observation
crew did discover a large amount of water entering from a ruptured seam in the
forward boiler room, causing her to list to port.125
The second phase of bombing began the next morning, and as the USS
Shawmut arrived to observe more tests, the Board of Observers noted that the
Ostfriesland had “settled into an even keel, but was down three feet by the stern, with
the aft air ports on the third deck just awash.”126 Without a crew on board toiling to
save her life and theirs, the Ostfriesland’s demise was that much closer at hand,
furthering the relative ease with which Mitchell’s plan was achievable. At 8:00 am, six
Army and five Navy Martin bombers arrived on site to begin their bombardment with
1,000-lb bombs. Mitchell’s Army planes made the first run, dropping bombs one at a
time and scoring the first direct hit at 8:32 am.127 The rules of the test dictated that the
planes cease bombing after each direct hit to give the Board of Observers a chance to
assess the damage. Likely under Mitchell’s orders, the bombers continued dropping
their 1,000-lb payloads in rapid succession, blatantly disregarding radio and visual
signals from the Shawmut to cease fire, so the inspection crew could board her. For
twenty minutes the Army planes ignored the Shawmut’s signals to continue their
bombardment, scoring two more direct hits before returning the all-clear to Captain
Johnson.

125

Wildenberg, 78.
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
126

77

While the Army defied the Navy’s parameters for the test, the Navy bombers
waited for the Shawmut’s signal to proceed, which never came as they were ordered to
return to land and rearm with the next payload of 2,000-lb bombs. When the
observation team finally made it aboard the Ostfriesland, they determined that the
bombs had done no critical damage to the ship, though the near-misses had
exacerbated the flooding, and the ship continued to take on water at a more rapid pace.
Mitchell’s experimental 2,000-lb bombs designed specifically for use against the
Ostfriesland represented his last chance to prove the value of air power against a
modern warship.
The rules of the tests stipulated that Mitchell’s Army planes could only drop
three 2,000-lb bombs, and only two were permitted to directly impact the ship before
the Navy called a cease-fire to inspect the damage. Knowing that the coming flight
was his last chance to sink her, Mitchell decided to change the rules and conduct the
remaining flights on his own terms. If he were to demonstrate the obsolescence of
navies in favor of air forces, his Army planes had to sink her before the Navy’s planes.
His devotion to air power as the future of warfare surpassed his respect for the chain
of command. Mitchell radioed the Captain Johnson to inform him that his Army
planes would not cease their bombardment until they had all dispensed their payloads
on the Ostfriesland. Mitchell’s timing was impeccable, reaching Johnson just as his
Army planes flew into the testing area in their Flying V formation.128
Mitchell observed the final assault on the Ostfriesland from his DH-4,
watching his Army flyers adopt a single line formation to drop their payloads one at a
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time. Each of the 8 MB-2 and 3 Handley Page 0/400s carried a single 2,000-lb bomb
developed specifically to sink a battleship of the Ostfriesland’s strength. Captain
Lawson dropped the first sighting shot at 12:15 pm. The first two bombs dropped from
2,500 feet missed the massive ship, and a second sighting shot was dropped at 12:23.
One minute later Captain Lawson’s 2,000-lb bomb glanced off the Ostfriesland’s side
armor and exploded in the water on her port side. Once again ignoring the rules of the
test, the Army planes continued dropping their payloads, and two more bombs
detonated in the water about twenty-five feet from her port side. The concussive blast
of the bombs cracked open the Ostfriesland’s already weakened hull, flooding her
with water. Mitchell’s pilots dropped seven 2,000-lb bombs in twenty-five minutes.
None of the seven directly hit the great vessel, but the power of the near-misses sent
the once-proud ship to her final resting place just twelve minutes after the final bomb
was dropped.129
Mitchell later described the sight of the sinking vessel in Winged Defense,
noting the sight of her passing with awe:
When a death blow has been dealt by a bomb to a vessel, there is no mistaking
it. Water can be seen to come up under both sides of the ship, she trembles all
over, as if her nerve center had been shattered, and she usually rises in the
water, sometimes clear, with her bow or stern. In a minute the Ostfriesland was
on her side; in two minutes she was sliding down by the stern and turning over
at the same time; in three minutes she was bottom-side up, looking like a
gigantic whale, the water oozing out of her seams as she prepared to go down
to the bottom, then gradually she went down stern first.130

Mitchell and his Army pilots viewed the sinking of the Ostfriesland with
triumph and revelry. They had proven the applicability of air forces against modern
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warships, but they had also solidified the rift between the Army and Navy air services.
According to Johnson’s plan for the bomb trials, the Navy’s Martin bombers were
supposed to get first crack at the mighty dreadnought, and the ship was supposed to
receive three total hits. Mitchell knew that to make his point his pilots had to be the
ones to sink the Ostfriesland, and he intended to sink her without permitting the Board
of Observers to board her.
Mitchell’s blatant disregard for the chain of command and the integrity of the
Navy’s design for the trials earned him the unrepentant and unflinching animosity of
Johnson and the heads of the Navy, especially the aviators. In his own writing,
Mitchell failed to address the enmity he inspired in his seafaring rivals, reveling that
the tests “conclusively proved the ability of aircraft to destroy ships of all classes on
the surface of the water.”131 History is not as forgiving of the man, and Wildenberg’s
account of the story clearly demonstrates not only the professional indignation
between Mitchell and Johnson, who was not an aviator, but the personal hatred the
two had for each other.
Mitchell’s conduct in the bomb tests permanently damaged his relationship
with the Navy and solidified a rift between Army and Navy pilots that continued for
decades afterward. The Navy designed the bomb trials to test the applicability of
certain types of aerial ordinances against modern battleships, an objective Mitchell
denied them by launching his planes without waiting for orders and refusing to cease
bombing until all the Army pilots had dropped their payloads. His refusal to follow
orders not only robbed the Navy of the opportunity to observe the applicability of their
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armor-piercing bombs, but speculation among historians and military experts suggests
had Mitchell followed the research design, the Navy pilots would have been
responsible for the sinking of the Ostfriesland.132
Mitchell’s failure to abide by the rules and his flagrant disregard of orders
infuriated Vice Admiral Johnson to the point that the made it his mission to harass and
thwart the former’s efforts for a unified Air Service modeled after the Royal Navy.133
Once Congress finally authorized the construction and development of aircraft carriers
for use in the Navy, the deployment of those mobile platforms took shape in a
strategic manner identical to Mitchell’s vision for their use.134 As he predicted in the
wake of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States would go to war with Japan. In
that conflict, the contest would be decided just as much in the air above the
battlefields, as on the battlefields themselves. Twenty-five years after the sinking of
the Ostfriesland, World War II demonstrated the accuracy with which Billy Mitchell
prophesied the future of warfare. By 1945, Mahan’s arguments for the battleship as the
supreme battle platform on the ocean had been silenced, and Mitchell’s arguments for
a well-armed and well researched air force had become the accepted school of tactical
thought. Mitchell’s vision of a unified Air Force was never realized in the way he had
imagined, and the Navy retained its own air service. Though the Army Air Corps
eventually became the United States Air Force, aviation in the United States remains
segregated between land and sea-based air services.
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Mitchell’s brashness and arrogance in his interaction with the Navy
characterized his career, and the mutual animosity he shared with Johnson served to
complicate relations between the aeronautical services of the United States. The
enmity reached its climax in 1925 when the U.S. Navy’s helium dirigible Shenandoah
crashed in a storm, killing its entire crew. This, coupled with the loss of three sea
planes en route from Hawaii to the mainland infuriated Mitchell. In a statement on
September 5, 1925 when he condemned the Navy’s aeronautical directors when he
said “These accidents are the direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence
and almost treasonable administration of the national defense by the navy and the war
departments.”135 The statements not only antagonized the Navy, but outraged
President Calvin Coolidge, who issued a direct order for the arrest and court martial of
Mitchell for violation of the 96th Article of War, a vague law designed to punish
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. 136The court martial
commenced in early November 1925 and lasted for seven weeks.
Of the twelve judges to sit in Mitchell’s court-martial, none were aviators, and
several were removed for their favorable bias. The youngest judge was Major General
Douglas MacArthur, who described the experience as the most dishonorable order he
had ever received. Mitchell’s supporters included famed aviators Hap Arnold, Eddie
Rickenbacker, and Fiorello La Guardia. Mitchell’s efforts to garner public interest in
air service manifested during his trial, where public opinion was solidly in his favor.
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Mitchell might have driven a rift between himself and the Navy, but the public still
perceived him as a war hero and a visionary, making his court-martial a political issue
as much a legal one.
The same press that had helped garner public interest in aviation and
sensationalize Mitchell’s case for air power seemed to turn on him now as most papers
reported that the man had gone too far. Despite the forty-one witnesses who testified
in his defense, Mitchell was found guilty of insubordination, conduct unbecoming of
an officer, and violation of the ninety-sixth Article of War.137 He was suspended from
rank, command, and duty, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five years,
which would allow him to remain in uniform long enough to collect a pension.138
Though his military career was effectively over, Mitchell continued to advocate for the
development of a strong air force for the rest of his life.
Though he died in 1935, World War II demonstrated the accuracy of
Mitchell’s predictions. In 1926, the Army Air Service moved out of the Signal Corps
and was reorganized into the Army Air Corps. Though far from his vision of a unified
air service, in 1947 the Air Corps was reorganized into the United States Air Force, an
independent branch of the U.S. military focused on air and space superiority. While
the Navy retains its own air service, the United States military has more aircraft and
aircraft carriers than any other military in the world. A controversial figure in his
lifetime, Mitchell’s legacy lives on as he is considered the father of the United States
Air Force, and a statue of his likeness was erected at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His
rivalry with the Navy served to mobilize the United States to research the strategic
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advantages of air power, and without him, the history of naval warfare would be
drastically different.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The SMS Ostfriesland sailed during a pivotal time in the history of naval
technology and strategy. Built in 1908, the ship was part of Germany’s efforts to
elevate its empire in accordance with the doctrines set forth by Alfred Thayer Mahan
in his Influence of Sea Power Upon History. A second-generation Dreadnought
battleship, her design represented the most advanced features in naval construction at
the time. She was built specifically to engage the British Grand Fleet in battle. In the
years leading up to the Great War, she was the pride of the High Seas Fleet and
symbolized Germany’s search for their place in the sun. She sailed into a world
dominated by the battleship, and in that capacity, she was born to contend.
The Ostfriesland’s armament, defenses and technology intensified the naval
arms race between Germany and Great Britain. At the close of the 19th century, Great
Britain was at the twilight of the era sometimes referred to as Pax Britannica, in which
it maintained a Two Power Standard naval policy that solidified its position as the
world’s greatest sea power. Essentially, Pax Britannica was peace enforced by British
rule, it was an era in which the Royal Navy policed the ocean commerce connecting
British colonies with the rest of the world. Britain had solidified its position as the
world’s largest military and colonial power with the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
Throughout the 19th century, no other country was able to challenge Britain’s
supremacy on the seas.
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When Kaiser Wilhelm II took power in the late 19th century, he immediately
sought to build a navy that could challenge Britain’s naval supremacy. Wilhelm
predicted a reorganization of global empires. As an ardent reader of Mahan’s work, he
believed that for Germany to be in a position to take advantage of the coming
international reconfiguration, it needed a powerful navy that would secure its position
as a global empire in the new world order. Once Britain had developed the
Dreadnought style of battleship, the German Navy quickly adapted. In 1908, the
Ostfriesland left drydock as one of the most powerful vessels on the sea.
For the first five years of her service, the Ostfriesland maintained her original
weapons configuration, designed for ship-to-ship battle on the high seas. In 1914,
however, she underwent a minor refit. The German navy replaced two of her tertiary
guns with 8.8cm Flak cannons for anti-air defense. This seemingly insignificant
refurbishing represented Ostfriesland’s first interaction with the shifting attitudes of
warfare in which she would play such a significant role. As a ship designed to engage
the world’s most powerful navy, the threat of an attack from above was not integrated
into her original designs. The addition of anti-air defensive measures at a point so
early in the Great War indicated the rapidity with which air power was emerging as a
vital battlefield tactic.
Over a century after Jutland, historians still debate the capacity of the German
Grand Fleet to challenge the British High Seas Fleet. Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe
refrained from the Nelsonian tactics of the 19th century in favor of an effective
blockade of the German navy by containing it in the North Sea. When the two
powerful fleets did meet, the outcome of the battles were contested. Both sides
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claimed victory; neither navy was destroyed. By the end of the war, however, morale
within the German fleet had deteriorated to such an extent that when its Admiral
sought to put their ships to the ultimate test in a direct, all-out battle, the crews
mutinied, robbing Germany of the engagement for which it designed its battlefleet.
The attitudes among German sailors at the close of the Great War were
tumultuous and complicated. While the many had refused to sail into a battle which
they viewed as a lost cause, they still resented the victors who now controlled their
fleet’s destiny. Such resentment led Admiral Ludwig von Reuter to order his men to
scuttle the fleet interred at Scapa Flow, and for the sailors to sabotage the vessels in
vile and revolting ways (including the use of human excrement) to make the transition
of their ships into allied hands as unpleasant as possible. This type of vandalism
characterized the Ostfriesland’s time sailing under the American flag, but the damage
was not as extensive on board her as it was to other vessels transferred to the United
States for reparations. While American sailors had to conduct extensive repairs on Uboats and tow some of the surface vessels, the Ostfriesland was mechanically sound
and able to make the Atlantic crossing under her own steam.
Once in United States waters, she was part of what American politicians called
a “Victory Parade,” - the purpose of which was to display the might of the vanquished
German Kaiserliche Marine. The terms of the Versailles Treaty dictated that the ships
be removed from military service or destroyed by 9 August 1921, and General
Mitchell’s rivalry with the Navy provided the perfect end to a service characterized by
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shifting attitudes and conflicting opinions on the future of naval warfare.139 Through
her involvement with the bomb tests, the Ostfriesland ended her life at the twilight of
the battleship while ushering in the age of aeronautics.
The Ostfriesland’s present resting place, 400 below the surface 65 miles off the
coast of Virginia, represents a valuable point of study in which historians and
underwater archaeologists might focus their attention. The wreck of the Ostfriesland
and the other German ships sank in the bomb tests are only accessible for visitation by
technical divers and remote operated vehicles, but they are vulnerable to damage by
deep-water fishing, especially trawling. Because of her place in the history of
technology and warfare in the early 20th century, the Ostfriesland is incredibly
important to the historical record, and a thorough study of her remains could prove
significant.
This thesis provides the context for such a study by tracking the life of the
Ostfriesland from her creation to her final sinking. From her launch in a military and
political climate that conformed to Mahan’s notions of naval superiority to her demise
as the target of an aerial bomb test in which Billy Mitchell argued that control of the
seas depended first on control of the air. Mitchell firmly believed a well-developed
and equipped air force would render surface fleets obsolete. The Ostfriesland bore
witness to the shifting and conflicting attitudes about warfare unlike any other vessel
of her time. Through the study of this great ship, this work has explored the historical
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context that motivated the great powers leading up to the First World War and the role
the Ostfriesland played in the shifting strategies of the 20th century.
As in all cases of progress, the development of airpower met resistance from
the traditionalists who insisted airplanes should remain auxiliary to the ground
services and had little application beyond that service. The initial design of the
Ostfriesland reflected these attitudes. Her sole purpose was to challenge the Royal
Navy. Her designers omitted any provision for defense against attack from above.
On the other extreme, Billy Mitchell adamantly fought for the development of
air power as the most important weapon in a nation’s arsenal. In his vision of the
military structure, all air services would be under a single command, including aircraft
carriers, and the Navy would be reduced to escort and support service for aeronautics.
He loudly and vehemently argued that adequate development of airpower would mean
the obsolescence of naval power, and the battleship in particular. He envisioned a fleet
of carrier groups deployed across the globe from which the United States would be in
constant position to defend its shores against attack and retaliate with haste.
Naval aviators also contributed to the debate. They wanted to work within the
existing structure of the Navy to develop aircraft carriers for offensive, defensive, and
auxiliary purposes. This savvy group of flyers appreciated Mitchell’s foresight, but
sought to work more moderately to achieve their goals. They acted within the
command structure, rather than loudly challenging it. It was the naval aviators who
won the argument, and in World War II they unequivocally demonstrated that the
outcome of war depended on the control of the air above the battlefield. After World
War II, the United States embraced the use of air power and aircraft carriers,
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developing the largest carrier fleet in the world. Carrier groups make up the backbone
of the modern U.S. Fleet, and while destroyers and cruisers haven’t been discontinued,
the battleship no longer plays a role in the formation of the United States Navy.
This thesis utilized the SMS Ostfriesland to demonstrate the conflicts
surrounding air and sea power. Though she did not resolve them, she nevertheless
contributed a verse to the powerful play in which Mitchell, Johnson, Tirpitz, Mahan,
and Wilhelm were all actors. Few historical figures can claim such an integral role of
intersectionality as this once-mighty ship. A proud sailor at her peak, she proudly
helped shape the future she had served so diligently to advance.
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APPENDIX A: SHIPS SANK BY AERIAL BOMB TESTS

Vessel
Vessel
Year Location Built
Name
Type
Built
Ostfriesland Helgoland- 1908 Wilhelmshaven
class
Imperial Naval
Battleship
Yard
Frankfurt

G-102

U-117

Length Beam
Armament
(feet) (feet)
548.5’ 93.5’ 12 x 12” heavy guns
14 x 5.9” rapid fire guns
6 x 20” torpedo tubes

Wiesbaden- 1915 Kiel Dock Yard
class Light
Cruiser
Torpedo1915
Kiel (Krupps
boat
Germania
Destroyer
Yard)
Submarine 1918 Hamburg
(Vulcan)
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465’

45’

18 x 5.9” guns
4 x 20” torpedo tubes

312’

30’

267’

24’

3 x 4.1” guns
6 x 20” torpedo tubes
Mines
1 x 5.9” gun
1 x 3.4” gun
4 x 20” torpedo tubes
42 mines

APPENDIX B: PLANS OF THE HELGOLAND-CLASS BATTLESHIPS
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APPENDIX C: PROFILE OF THE SMS OSTFRIESLAND
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